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I. INTRODUCTION
The mortgage is a traditional and well known vehicle by which a
lender may secure real estate loans. In 1965, the Legislature provided
lenders with an additional device for securing such loans by enacting
the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act.' With the increased popularity of low
equity financing2 lenders had sought a more efficient means of recov-
1. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1001 to - 1018 (1981). The Trust Deeds Act was introduced
at the request of the Nebraska Mortgage Association, which was comprised of
financial institutions active in real estate lending. Hearings on L.B. 616 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Neb. Leg. (1965) (statement of Sen. Sam Klaver,
Chairman Judiciary Comm.) [hereinafter cited Hearings on LB. 616]. For a
drafter's perspective of the Act, see Kessner, The Trust Deed as Security in the
Real Estate Transaction, 50 NEB. L. REv. 386 (1970).
2. Low equity financing describes the amount of a purchaser's initial investment in
property. The investment is measured by loan-to-value ratio, which indicate the
borrower's investment as a percentage of the market value of the trust property.
Until the middle 1930's, loan-to-value ratios were set far below present levels.
Typically, the pre-depression home mortgage did not exceed 50 to 60 percent of
the appraised value of the real estate. With the advent of the depression, the
housing industry fell into ruins. In order to revive it, Congress lifted loan-to-
value ratios for Farmers Home Administration (FHA) insured mortgages to
levels once considered to be unsafe. Current loan-to-value ratios can reach 95
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ering their security upon default by borrowers.3 Foreclosure was con-
sidered to be a costly and time-consuming process which subjected the
collateral to unnecessary risks.4 In contrast, the Trust Deeds Act au-
thorized lenders to reserve a power of sale, which, when properly ex-
ercised, extinguishes a debtor's interests in the collateral without
resort to judicial proceedings.5 Because of the relative ease with
which a lender may recover his collateral under the Act, trust deeds
have been praised as a means of encouraging increased lending activity
in Nebraska.6
Since its inception, the Trust Deeds Act has received a lukewarm
reception in Nebraska.7 Instead of utilizing the trust deed to secure
real estate loans, lenders have continued to use the more familiar
percent. See, e.g., A. AXELROD, C. BERGER, & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER
AND FINANCE 101-05 (2d ed. 1978).
3. A trust deed is essentially an alternative to the use of the mortgage as a security
device. The primary disadvantage of using a mortgage to secure debt is the delay
to the lender in the recovery of the secured property. In contrast, a trust deed
containing a power of sale provision will allow a lender to recover his security
with substantially lower costs in time and money than those realized in judicial
foreclosure. G. OSBORNE, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.19 (1979).
4. Proponents of the Trust Deeds Act took the position that because many home
buyers had little or no equity in their homes, there was no incentive for the pur-
chaser to make his monthly mortgage payments. Hearings on LB. 616, supra
note 1, at 5-6 (statement of Theodore Kessner). See also Kessner, supra note 1, at
387-88. The Trust Deeds Act was designed to protect the lender by providing a
means by which the security could be recovered soon after default, so that the
property does not have an opportunity to deteriorate.
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1005 (Supp. 1984). A power of sale is a contractual right
granted to the lender in a trust deed, mortgage, or separate instrument, whereby
the collateral may be sold without recourse to judicial proceedings. Although
such a sale is made without judicial supervision, it is generally held that the
lender must comply with statutory notice procedures so as to protect the debtor's
interests in the collateral. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text. Fur-
thermore, in some jurisdictions the trustee's sale must be confirmed by a court.
However, such practices have serious constitutional ramifications. See infra note
27. The Nebraska Trust Deeds Act authorizes the use of power of sale foreclo-
sure of trust deeds, conditioning the exercise of such powers on the full compli-
ance with all of its notice and filing requirements. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1006
(Supp. 1984). In Nebraska, there is no judicial confirmation of the exercise of a
power of sale.
6. Proponents of the Trust Deeds Act argued that unless Nebraska fostered a cli-
mate to protect lenders of low equity loans, it would be difficult to entice mort-
gage money into the State. In order to protect lenders, it was deemed necessary
to legislatively authorize the use of a power of sale. This authorization shortens
the period from default to the time that the lender realizes his security. Hearings
on LB. 616, supra note 1 (Introducer's Statement of Purpose). See also Kessner,
supra note 1, at 386, 388.
7. The practitioner's unfamiliarity with the security device offers one possible ex-
planation for why the trust deed was not widely used in Nebraska. Kessner re-
lates: "The comment was made to me earlier this week when someone had seen
the program for this meeting [discussion of trust deeds] that they had an estate
with a trust problem in it and they were interested to see what I was going to talk
1985]
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mortgage or installment land contract.8 Only recently have trust
deeds gained acceptance in the lending community. Because of the
limited use of trust deeds in Nebraska, case law interpreting the Act is
almost nonexistent.9 Therefore, reference must be made to the law of
other jurisdictions for guidance in the use of trust deeds. Further-
more, mortgage law may provide insight as to the proper resolution of
issues that the Act does not address. As the economic function of a
trust deed and a mortgage is the same,10 reference will be made to
Nebraska mortgage law, when appropriate."
about. This is not estate planning, because I don't know anything about that."
Kessner, supra note 1, at 387.
8. Traditional methods of securing real estate loans included the mortgage and the
installment land contract. See generally R. VOLKMER, TRADITIONAL REAL Es-
TATE SECURITY DEVICEs 2-10 (Sept. 1982); Hancock, Installment Contracts for the
Purchase of Land in Nebraska, 30 NEB. L. REV. 953 (1959); Comment, Installment
Land Contracts: Remedies In Nebraska, 61 NEB. L. REV. 750 (1981). Additionally,
a deed absolute, coupled with a contract of defeasance, may be executed as a se-
curity device. If such a transaction is used to secure the payment of an obligation,
the relationship will be treated as a mortgage by Nebraska courts. See Campbell
v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 161 Neb. 653, 660, 74 N.W.2d 546, 552-53 (1956); Ash-
brook v. Briner, 137 Neb. 104, 107, 288 N.W. 374, 376 (1939); Names v. Names, 48
Neb. 701, 706, 67 N.W. 751, 752-53 (1896); Stall v. Jones, 47 Neb. 706, 715-16, 66
N.W. 653, 656 (1896); Connally v. Giddings, 24 Neb. 131, 134, 37 N.W. 939, 941
(1888). In order to prove that a deed absolute coupled with a defeasance was
intended to be a mortgage, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the
transaction was intended to be a method of providing security and not an absolute
conveyance. O'Hanlon v. Barry, 87 Neb. 522, 526, 127 N.W. 860, 862 (1910); Wilde
v. Homan, 58 Neb. 634, 636, 79 N.W. 546, 547 (1899). Parol evidence is admissible
to prove such an intent. Morrow v. Jones, 41 Neb. 867, 876, 60 N.W. 369, 372
(1894).
9. Blair Co. v. American Sav. Co., 184 Neb. 557, 169 N.W.2d 292 (1969).
10. Prior to the enactment of the Trust Deeds Act, Nebraska recognized that a trust
deed would be treated like a mortgage, notwithstanding the differences between
the two security devices. Fiske v. Mayhew, 90 Neb. 196, 198-200, 133 N.W. 195, 196
(1911); Comstock v. Michael, 17 Neb. 288, 289, 22 N.W. 549, 550 (1885); Hurley v.
Estes, 6 Neb. 386, 390-91 (1877). Furthermore, Nebraska statutes provided that if
a deed was given as a security device and not as an absolute conveyance or real
property, then the transaction would be considered a mortgage. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 76-251 (1981). See also Koehn v. Koehn, 164 Neb. 169, 179, 81 N.W.2d 900, 907
(1957) (an instrument intended to be security for a debt shall be treated in equity
as a mortgage). As a result, trust deeds were governed by Nebraska mortgage
law, and were required to be foreclosed just as any mortgage.
11. Although a trust deed and a mortgage serve the identical purpose of securing
debts, the Nebraska Supreme Court has indicated that the Trust Deeds Act cre-
ated a body of law independent and distinct from mortgage law. Blair Co. v.
American Sav. Co., 184 Neb. 557, 169 N.W.2d 292 (1969). The decision, however,
should be limited to the facts before the court. It had been argued that as mort-
gage law prohibited power of sale foreclosure, the same should be true when a
trust deed is foreclosed. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that the Act
authorized a security device which was not formerly available in Nebraska, and
thus was not subject to the restrictions placed on mortgages. Id at 558-59, 169
N.W.2d at 294. Although Blair holds that mortgage law will not control trust
[Vol. 64:92
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The purpose of this Article is to provide an overview of the Ne-
braska Trust Deeds Act so as to familiarize the practitioner with the
trust deed as an alternative security device. This Article will first ex-
amine the general characteristics of a trust deed, distinguishing such
an arrangement from a mortgage. The Nebraska Act will then be ana-
lyzed with a view toward raising several of the procedural and sub-
stantive issues left unanswered by the drafters of the Act. It is hoped
that this Article will enable the practitioner to become familiar with
trust deeds and thus stimulate the use of trust deeds as a security de-
vice in Nebraska.
II. THE TRUST DEED
A trust deed12 serves the same function as a mortgage, as it secures
the performance of a debtor on a note or other obligation. A trust
deed creates a three-party relationship whereby the debtor (trustor)
conveys legal title to the trust property to a trustee, who in turn holds
legal title as security for the lender (beneficiary).13 Although a trust
deed serves the same purposes as a mortgage, there are distinct differ-
ences between the two security devices.
The primary distinction between a trust deed and a mortgage be-
comes clear when a debtor defaults on the underlying obligation. For
example, when a mortgagor defaults on a note secured by a mortgage,
the mortgagee is generally forced to resort to judicial proceedings14 in
order to foreclose the borrower's interests.15 Although many jurisdic-
tions allow a mortgagee to reserve a power of sale, Nebraska has long
deed issues when the Trust Deeds Act conflicts with mortgage law, the decision
should not be extended to the case involving an issue on which the Act is silent.
In such an event, the practitioner should be allowed to consult mortgage law for
guidance. Because real property law varies from state to state, Nebraska mort-
gage law would provide more insight than would the trust deeds law of other
jurisdictions. Therefore, when the Trust Deeds Act fails to address an issue, Ne-
braska mortgage law should be consulted for guidance unless valid policy consid-
erations exist for not doing so.
12. A trust deed should not be confused with a land trust ("Illinois Trust"), a device
often used to conceal land ownership. Under the typical land trust, title to the
real estate is held by a corporate trustee. The trustee's powers are restricted by
an unrecorded trust agreement whereby the beneficiary retains full powers of
management and control. In addition to the concealment of land ownership, land
trust are used to avoid probate, facilitate multi-party ownership of real estate,
and insulate real estate holdings from claims of general creditors. See generally
Garrett, Land Trusts, 1955 ILL. L. FORUM 655 (1955); Comment, The Illinois Land
Trust and Nebraska Law, 47 NEB. L. REv. 101 (1968).
13. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1001 (1981).
14. A mortgagee has two distinct and exclusive options in Nebraska: (1) suit at law
on the note, and (2) foreclosure. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
15. Several states specifically authorize power of sale provisions in mortgages so that
judicial foreclosure may be avoided. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 35-10-1 (1975); MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 7-105 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479:25 (1983); Wis.
1985]
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followed the rule that such provisions are invalid,16 and thus, the Ne-
braska mortgagee must judicially foreclose the borrower's interests.
In contrast, the Trust Deeds Act gives a beneficiary under a trust deed
the option to exercise a power of sale or to foreclose the trustor's in-
terests in the manner provided by foreclosure law.17 As a result, the
Act provides Nebraska lenders with a mechanism whereby they may
exercise a power of sale and in effect reverses a long line of case law
holding that power of sale provisions are invalid.
A trust deed may be further distinguished from a mortgage upon
examination of the debtor's rights upon default. The Nebraska mort-
gagor is recognized to have a right to redeem mortgaged property after
default.1 8 In order to do so the mortgagor must pay all amounts out-
STAT. ANN. § 708.05 (West 1981). See also, G. OSBORNE, MORGAGES §§ 337-345 (2d
ed. 1970).
16. Athough power of sale provisions are commonly found in mortgages in many
states, the Nebraska courts have long adhered to the position that such provisions
are void, so that a mortgagee must instead resort to judicial foreclosure.
Staunchfield v. Jeutter, 4 Neb. (unoff.) 847, 848, 96 N.W. 642, 643 (1903); Cullen v.
Casey, 1 Neb. (unoff.) 344, 347-48, 95 N.W. 605, 607 (1901); Comstock v. Michael, 17
Neb. 288, 291, 22 N.W. 549, 552 (1885); Kyger v. Ryley, 2 Neb. 20, 27-28 (1872). The
decisions fail to explain the judicial hostility toward power of sale foreclosure and
the rule appears to be based solely upon judicial mandate. In Wheeler v. Sexton,
34 F. 154 (D. Neb. 1888), the court noted that:
The validity of such a power, and of the sale made under it, at common
law may be conceded; and it is also that in Nebraska statutes can be
found no express prohibition upon such a power; yet it seems to me that
the supreme court of Nebraska, by two or three decisions at an interval
of many years, has ruled against the validity of a sale made under such
power ....
Id. at 155.
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1005 (1984 Supp.). Under a Trust Deeds Act, if the trustee
wishes to exercise a power of sale, such a right must have been reserved to him in
the trust deed. IM As the statute is explicit in requiring the power to be ex-
pressly reserved in the trust deed, the practitioner must take care to include such
a provision.
18. The morgagor's equity of redemption is regarded as an incident of every mortgage
even though not expressly provided for therein. See Campbell v. Ohio Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 161 Neb. 653, 674, 74 N.W.2d 546, 559 (1956) (right of redemption is an
essential and inherent characteristic of a mortgage, although not expressed
therein); Sedlack v. Duda, 144 Neb. 567, 576, 13 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1944) (right of
redemption is a favorite of equity, and cannot be abrogated without strict compli-
ance with steps necessary to divest it, and with due process). Snoke v. Beach, 105
Neb. 127, 128, 179 N.W. 389, 391 (1920) (equitable right of redemption which at-
taches to a mortgage cannot be cut off by contract or by understanding of the
parties).
A mortgagor's equity of redemption has its roots in early common law, where
a mortgage was essentially a conveyance of property to a creditor to secure the
performance of an obligation. Upon breach, however, title became absolutely
vested in the mortgagee. Courts of equity found this result distasteful, and
looked beyond the terms of the transaction to the true character of the agree-
ment. Because the transaction was one of security and not one of sale, the equity
courts provided a mortgagor with the right to redeem the property following
[Vol. 64:92
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standing on the obligation as well as any costs incurred by the mortga-
gee in enforcing debt.19 In contrast, when the beneficiary elects to
exercise a power of sale foreclosure, a trustor has a thirty-day period
in which a default may be cured and the debt reinstated.20 In order to
cure a default, the trustor need only pay the amount in default, not
the entire balance of the debt. The Act thus gives the trustor greater
rights than those of a mortgagor: a default may be cured by paying
only the arrearage, whereas a mortgagor must remit the entire bal-
ance of the debt owed in order to redeem the mortgaged property.
The trustee's power of sale makes the trust deed an attractive se-
curity device for lenders. However, there are certain disadvantages in
the use of a trust deed. Of primary importance are the limitations
breach by discharging the obligation in full. See generally G. OSBORNE, supra
note 15, at §§ 302-06.
A mortgagor's equitable right to redeem should not be confused with a statu-
tory right to redemption. A statutory right of redemption arises after the confir-
mation of the foreclosure sale and permits a mortgagor to redeem the property
for a stated period of time, ranging from six months to over two years. Although
Nebraska has not adopted a statutory right of redemption, 26 states provide such
relief for the debtor. G. OSBORNE, supra note 3, at § 8.4 n.81.
The statutory right of redemption was created to give a mortgagor additional
time to refinance his debt and thus save the property from the foreclosure sale. It
was also deemed to be a method of forcing the mortgagor to bid up to fair market
value at the foreclosure sale, lest the mortgagor obtain financing and reclaim the
property by paying the bid price. G. OSBORNE, supra note 15, at § 8.
The statutory right of redemption has generally not accomplished its pur-
poses. It has chilled bidding at foreclosure sales, as few purchasers want to en-
dure the mortgagor's threat of re-entry. Moreover, statutory rights of
redemption are generally viewed as resulting in a more expensive and time-con-
suming foreclosure process. See, e.g., United States v. Stadium Apartments, 425
F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1970).
19. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1530 (1979). See also County of Madison v. Crippen, 143
Neb. 474, 10 N.W.2d 260 (1943); Knox County v. Perry, 142 Neb. 678, 7 N.W.2d 475
(1943). A mortgagor's right to redeem exists until judicial sale has been con-
firmed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The statute has been interpreted to
mean that persons holding redemption rights may redeem at any time before a
final order on appeal to the Supreme Court. Mummert v. Grant, 118 Neb. 651, 225
N.W. 773 (1929); Philadelphia Co. v. Gustus, 55 Neb. 435, 75 N.W 1107 (1898).
However, if the party asserting redemption rights was omitted form the original
foreclosure action, then an action to redeem may be brought at any time within
10 years after a cause of action has accrued. Dorsey v. Conrad, 49 Neb. 443, 68
N.W. 645 (1896).
Generally, the mortgagor, as well as any person claiming an interest in real
property as junior lienors or encumbrancers, may redeem after a foreclosure sale.
Thus a junior lienor may redeem should the mortgagor elect not to do so. G.
OSBORNE, supra note 15, at § 304. However, the right to redeem does not extend
to a junior lienor in Nebraska when he has been made a party to a foreclosure
action, for it is held that his interests are adequately protected by permitting him
to bid at the foreclosure sale. Keller v. Boehmer, 130 Neb. 763, 266 N.W. 577
(1936).
20. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1012 (1981). See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
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placed on a beneficiary's right to a deficiency judgment. While several
jurisdictions prohibit the recovery of a deficiency after the beneficiary
has exercised a power of sale, the Nebraska Act limits the amount
recoverable in a deficiency action.2 1 In contrast, a mortgagee may re-
cover all amounts not realized after a judicial sale of the encumbered
property.22
A second potential disadvantage to lenders in using trust deeds in-
volves an element of uncertainty that surrounds the Act. Although
the Act is quite specific in most respects, it leaves several questions
unanswered.23 Furthermore, during the nineteen-year history of the
Act, the Nebraska Supreme Court has had only one opportunity to
interpret the Act.2 4 The effect of this uncertainty is to force the prac-
titioner to look to Nebraska mortgage law, as well as to trust deeds
acts of other jurisdictions, for guidance in resolving issues arising
under the Nebraska Act.
Beyond the uncertainty associated with the Act, constitutional is-
sues are raised whenever a trustee exercises a power of sale.
Although the Act has survived a challenge under the Nebraska Con-
stitution, the decision focused only on the limited issues concerning
the contitutionality of a power of sale foreclosure.25 The issue re-
mains open as to whether the Act violates federal due process princi-
ples. In light of recent Supreme Court decisions holding certain
replevin and garnishment proceedings invalid,26 it would appear that
nonjudicial sales might imply due process difficulties. However, sev-
21. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1013 (1981). By limiting the beneficiary's recovery, the Act
provides the trustor protection from the lender. See infra notes 164-72 and ac-
companying text.
22. See, e.g., Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Claussen, 138 Neb. 518, 293 N.W. 424
(1940); Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Cramb, 137 Neb. 553, 290 N.W. 440 (1940).
23. The Act does not address the scope of the trustee's authority under the Act, see
infra notes 78-85; or whether junior lienor's rights are extinguished by the
trustee's sale, see infra notes 145-46. One ambiguity was addressed recently when
the Legislature authorized the use of trust deeds to secure future advances. See
infra note 48.
24. Blair Co. v. American Sav. Co., 184 Neb. 557, 169 N.W.2d 292 (1969).
25. Id. In Blair, the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act was challenged under the Nebraska
Constitution. It was contended that the Act was in conflict with a statute which
provided that when a deed is given as security, it should be treated as a mortgage.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-251 (1981). It was argued that because a trust deed must
be treated like a mortgage, and thus must be foreclosed like a mortgage, the
power of sale provision contained therein was invalid. Upholding the validity of
the Act, the court noted that it authorized the use of a security device not avail-
able prior to the Act's inception, as it permits foreclosure by sale without the
necessity of judicial proceedings. The court concluded that the Act is complete
and independent of mortgage law, as it prescribes in detail the procedures to be
followed in the execution and enforcement of trust deeds.
26. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuen-
tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (upholding the
[Vol. 64:92
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eral federal courts have rejected due process challenges in cases in-
volving statutory schemes similar to the Nebraska Act; thus, it
appears that the Act would withstand such constitutional challenges.27
validity of a Louisiana summary sequestration remedy under an installment sales
contract in the face of a due process attack).
27. Although a comprehensive analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, it should be noted that the federal courts have entertained a number of suits
challenging the validity of power of sale provisions on both fifth and fourteenth
amendment due process grounds. The major question in this area is whether
state action can be found in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, since the four-
teenth amendment prohibits the state from depriving any person of property
without due process of law. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state
courts enforcing racially discriminatory restrictive covenants violates due pro-
cess). Similarly, the fifth amendment cases focus on finding such a deprivation by
the federal government, and arise when federally regulated entities such as the
Federal National Mortgage Association or the Farmers Home Administration ex-
ercise power of sale foreclosures. An overwhelming majority of the fourteenth
amendment cases have recognized that power of sale provisions are contractual
rights established between a lender and borrower. The courts have concluded
that the state statutes providing for nonjudicial sales only serve to regulate the
exercise of that right, so that state action is not present. See Levine v. Stein, 560
F.2d 1175 (4th Cir. 1977); Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23
(6th Cir. 1975); Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir.
1975); Kenly v. Miracle Properties, 412 F.Supp. 1072 (D. Ariz. 1976); Leisure Es-
tates of Am. Inc. v. Carmel Dev. Co., 371 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Tex 1974); Law v.
U.S.D.A., 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Similarly, federal government action
has been found absent in the fifth amendment cases, in which the courts have
held that even with trust deeds containing power of sale provisions approved by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the power of sale agree-
ment is not a power of a governmental nature. Warren v. Government Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n., 611 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1980).
One case, however, has found that a state statutory scheme regulating power
of sale provisions violates fourteenth amendment notions by failing to provide for
personal notice to the debtor and for an opportunity to be heard prior to the
trustee's sale. Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975). In Tur-
ner, the statutory scheme required that certain reports concerning the trustee's
sale had to be filed with the clerk of the superior court. The clerk was required
to verify the reports and was given contempt powers to punish those persons who
failed to file reports. Due to the broad powers given to the clerk, state action was
found to be present under this particular statutory scheme.
Nebraska's Act should be able to withstand a due process challenge, as it
would be difficult to find state action under the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act. In
contrast to Turner, Nebraska does not provide for judicial supervision of the
trustee's sale. See infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text. It has been sug-
gested that even though the Nebraska Act would most likely survive a due pro-
cess challenge, a more prudent approach would be to ensure that the trustor and
all junior lienors receive written notice of the trustee's sale regardless of whether
they request it. McClymont & Thompson, The Nebraska Trust Deeds Act- Com-
ing Out of the Closet, 1 NEB. REAL EsT. L.J. 49, 51 (1983).
For a more thorough discussion of whether a nonjudicial sale violates due pro-
cess principles, see Comment, Leen, Galbraith, & Grant, Due Process and Deeds
of Trust-Strange Bedfellows?, 48 WASH. L. REV. 763 (1973); Muller, Deed of
Trust Foreclosure, The Need For Reform ... Fair Play and The Constitution Re-
visited, 29 J. Mo. B. 222 (1973); Nelson, Deed of Trust Foreclosure Under Powers
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A final preliminary consideration surrounds the effect of power of
sale foreclosure on the title of the encumbered property. Although
power of sale foreclosure is more efficient and less costly than judicial
foreclosure, the title that it produces may be less marketable than that
generated by judicial foreclosure. That instability of title is the result
of the lack of judicial supervision associated with power of sale fore-
closure. Because judicial foreclosure is an adversary proceeding, po-
tential defects will be brought to the attention of the court for judicial
resolution. In contrast, a trustee's sale is not subject to judicial super-
vision, making it difficult for a trustor to raise defects during the sale
proceedings. Consequently, there is a lack of judicial finality to pro-
vide protection against a subsequent attack on the title generated by a
trustee's sale.28
III. NEBRASKA TRUST DEEDS ACT
A. Rights of a Trustor
A trust deed is defined by the Act as a deed that conveys real prop-
erty as security for the trustor's obligation to the beneficiary.2 9 The
Act suggests that a trust deed, in contrast to a mortgage, conveys legal
title to the trust property to the trustee rather than creating a lien
thereon.3 0 Although it might seem that the trustor would relinquish
of Sale: Constitutional Problems, Legal Alternatives, 28 Mo. B.J. 428 (1972);
Comment, The Constitutionality of the California Trustee's Sale, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 1282 (1973); Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REV.
871 (1978); Comment, Real Property-Changes in North Carolina's Foreclosure
Law, 54 N.C.L. REV. 903 (1976); Comment, Due Process Evolution-Fuentes and
the Deed of Trust, 26 Sw. L.J. 876 (1972); Comment, The Constitutionality of
Power of Sale Foreclosure in Alaska, 6 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REV. 90 (1976).
28. See generally G. OSBORNE, supra note 3, at § 7.18.
29. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1001(3) (1981).
30. "Trust Deed shall mean a deed executed in conformity with sections 76-1001 to
76-1018 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the perform-
ance of an obligation of the grantor or other person named in the deed to a benefi-
ciary." NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1001(3) (1981) (emphasis added). The language of
the Act suggests that legal title is conveyed to the trustee for the limited purpose
of securing the trustor's performance on the obligation. Thus, legal title passes to
the trustee, while the trustor retains beneficial title in the trust property. See
Ashbrook v. Briner, 137 Neb. 104, 288 N.W. 374 (1939) (when warranty deed is
executed to secure indebtedness owing to the grantee, legal title passes to the
grantee, while the grantor retains the right of redemption); Northwestern State
Bank v. Hanks, 122 Neb. 262, 240 N.W. 281 (1932) (legal title, under absolute deed
given to secure indebtedness owing to grantee, passes to grantee, and equity will
regard the grantor as retaining an interest in the premises).
Because the Trust Deeds Act passes legal title to the trustee, it in effect
reverses earlier case law which held that a trust deed was the equivalent of a
mortgage, and operated to create a lien on the trustor's property. Fiske v. May-
hew, 90 Neb. 196, 133 N.W. 195 (1911); Hurley v. Estes, 6 Neb. 386 (1877). In con-
trast, Nebraska mortgage law recognizes that a mortgagor retains legal title to
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all legal rights to the trust property upon execution of a trust deed, it
is generally held that the trustor conveys only bare legal title to the
trustee.3 ' Thus, the trustee acquires only those rights which will en-
able him to convey the trust property to a purchaser at the trustee's
sale, while all other incidents of ownership remain in the trustor.
Consequently, there appears to be little difference under the Act be-
tween a trustee's title and a lien held by a mortgagee.3 2
If the trustor or his successors acquire any right or interest in the
trust property after the execution of the trust deed, such interests in-
ure to the benefit of the trustee as security for the obligation secured
by the trust deed.3 3 If the trustor did not hold title to the trust prop-
erty at the execution of the trust deed, but subsequently acquired title,
then such interests automatically pass to the trustee. Consequently,
the Act is consistent with Nebraska mortgage law, which recognizes
that after-acquired interests in the mortgagor automatically pass to
the mortgagee.3 4
Although the Act fails to define the term "interest" as used
therein, the term could reasonably be interpreted to include existing
imporvements as well as subsequent improvements to the trust prop-
erty. As such, the trust deed operates to convey to the trustee any
the mortgaged property. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-276 (1981); Morrill v. Skinner, 57
Neb. 164, 77 N.W. 375 (1898); Orr v. Broad, 52 Neb. 490, 72 N.W. 850 (1897).
It is not universally accepted that a trust deed conveys legal title to the
trustee. In Washington for example, it has been held that a trust deed operates to
create a lien on the trustor's property. Morrill v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 94 Wash.
258, 162 P. 360 (1917). See also G. GLENN, MORTGAGES § 20 (1943) (trustee ac-
quires no title or estate in the trust property, but is merely an agent for both the
beneficiary and the trustor and is vested with a power of sale, which, when prop-
erly exercised, passes title to a purchaser).
31. Although the Act provides that title to the trust property passes to the trustee
after the execution of the trust deed, the Act does not establish the rights re-
tained by a trustor in his trust property. Furthermore, Nebraska case law has not
yet addressed this point. In California, it has been held that although a trustee
acquires legal title under a trust deed, none of the incidents of ownership pass to
the trustee, so that a trustor, like a mortgagor, retains the right to possession as
well as other incidents of ownership. Sacremento Bank v. Alcorn, 121 Cal. 379, 53
P. 813 (1898); Hamel v. Gootkin, 202 Cal. App. 2d 27, 20 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1962).
32. It is doubtful whether the distinction between a lien and a legal title passing to
the trustee has more than academic relevance. However, if the trustee were
deemed to hold legal title, he could be subject to suit on claims arising out of
transactions involving the trust property.
33. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1002 (Supp. 1984).
34. See Butts v. Hale, 157 Neb. 334, 59 N.W.2d 583 (1953) (every right or interest held
by a mortgagor in the mortgaged property, together with all subsequently ac-
quired rights, easements, and privileges pass with the mortgage, though reference
is not specially made to them); Pulver v. Connelly, 93 Neb. 188, 139 N.W. 1014
(1913) (if a mortgage purports to convey the whole property, then an after-ac-
quired interest of the mortgagor will accrue to the title conveyed by the
mortgagor).
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interest in property permanently attached to the real estate as well as
all subsequent improvements. 35 Such an interpretation would be con-
sistent with Nebraska mortgage law which recognizes that annexa-
tions permanently affixed to the real estate are presumed to pass with
a mortgage,36 and that permanent improvements made after the exe-
cution of a mortgage are deemed to become part of the mortgaged es-
tate.37 If the parties to a trust deed want the security interest to
extend to improvements to the trust property, the better practice
would be to include such a recital in the trust deed, to evidence that
intent.38
The trustor generally has the same rights in the trust property as a
mortgagor would have in property subject to a mortgage.3 9 Although
35. Although the term "interest" is not defined by the Act, the term "real property"
is deemed to include: "any estate or interest in land, including all buildings, fix-
tures and improvements thereon and all rights-of-way, easements, rents, issues,
profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances there-
unto belonging, used or enjoyed with said land, or any part thereof . NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1001(5) (1981).
36. Nebraska mortgage law recognizes a distinction between fixtures or improve-
ments permanently attached to the encumbered property, and personal property,
in that personal property is not subject to a mortgagee's interest. The distinction
between fixtures and personal property is made by examining the permanence of
the improvement, the purpose for which it may be used, the intention of the party
in making the improvement, and the expectations of the transferee. Thus, where
goods were merely placed on the mortgaged premises for storage and were not
permanently affixed, such goods were held to be personal property and thus not
subject to the lender's interest. Haver v. North American Hotel Co., 111 Neb. 13,
17, 195 N.W. 483, 487 (1923). However, where a grain bin was anchored to a con-
crete slab, it was considered to have been affixed to the real property in such a
manner so as to pass with the property on sale. Stibor v. Farrell, 177 Neb. 437,
444, 129 N.W.2d 449, 452-53 (1964). This was true even though with respect to a
third party lender, the grain bin constituted personal property. Id-
37. A building, intended to be a permanent improvement and placed on the real es-
tate by a mortgagor while the property was encumbered, was held to become part
of the mortgaged estate and thus subject to the lien of the mortgagee. Home Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Mount Zion Baptist Church, 139 Neb. 867, 870-71, 299 N.W. 287,
289 (1941).
38. The case may arise in which the beneficiary wants to take a security interest in
machinery or other improvements to the trust property as additional collateral
for the loan. The Trust Deeds Act appears to be limited to interests in real prop-
erty or fixtures and improvements, and does not extend to personal property.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1001(5) (1981). As the precise nature of such items as ma-
chinery cannot be determined with absolute certainty, the beneficiary runs the
risk that the collateral will be held to be personal property. As a result, the bene-
ficiary becomes an unsecured creditor with regard to such equipment. In order to
protect his interests in such items, the lender should file a financing statement
that complies with Uniform Commercial Code requirements. A "fixture filing" is
unnecessary, however, as it serves only to defeat conflicting interests of encum-
brancers or owners of real estate. See U.C.C. §§ 9-313(1)(b); 9-313(4), (5), (6), (7)
(1980). The lender is adequately protected by the security interest taken in the
trust deed, if the equipment is ultimately determined to be real property.
39. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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the Act is silent on the issue of possession, the trustor, like the mort-
gagor, should have the right to remain in possession of the trust prop-
erty until after the trustee's sale.40 Furthermore, the trustor should
be entitled to all rents and profits generated by the trust property un-
til such time that the trustor's interests are extinguished.41 Like a
mortgagor, the trustor may assign his rights of possession or rents to
the beneficiary by specifically providing for such an assignment in the
trust deed.42
A trustor, like a mortgagor, should be able to transfer or assign his
interests in the trust property even though the trustee holds legal ti-
tle.43 Such a transfer, however, may result in an acceleration of the
outstanding debt if the trustor attempts to convey the trust property
40. The Act impliedly grants a trustor the right to possess the trust property, at least
until one month after the filing of a notice of default, by allowing the trustor the
right to cure a default during this time period. If the trustor were not allowed
possession during this period, the right to cure would be meaningless. See NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1012 (1981).
The Act is silent as to the trustor's right to possession beyond the one month
cure period. However, considerations that permit a mortgagor to remain in pos-
session until the confirmation of the foreclosure sale apply in the case of the trus-
tor. Because a mortgagor retains title to the encumbered property until after the
confirmation of the judicial sale, he is entitled to the rents, profits, and possession
of the property up to the date of confirmation. Westerfield v. South Omaha Loan
& Bldg. Ass'n, 75 Neb. 53, 56, 105 N.W. 1087, 1088 (1905), rehg denied, 75 Neb. 58,
107 N.W. 1010 (1906); Hatch v. Shold, 62 Neb. 764, 766, 87 N.W. 908, 909 (1901);
Yeazel v. White, 40 Neb. 432, 441, 58 N.W. 1020, 1022 (1894). Similarly, because
the trustor holds beneficial title in the trust property until the date of the
trustee's sale, he too should be entitled to possession.
41. If the trustor has rights of possession until the date of the trustee's sale, then he
would also be entitled to all rents and profits generated by the property until that
date. See Snoke v. Beach, 105 Neb. 127, 179 N.W. 389 (1920) (if an instrument is a
mortgage, it follows that the mortgagor is entitled to possession as well as to the
rents and profits generated by the premises); Connolly v. Giddings, 24 Neb. 131,
37 N.W. 939 (1888) (a mortgagor, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, is
entitled to the possession of the mortgaged property until foreclosure and sale).
42. If the case law generated under the Trust Deeds Act follows the approach of
Nebraska mortgage law, the parties should be free to make whatever arrang-
ments they wish for possession and rents upon default. See Central Sav. Bank v.
First Cadco Corp., 186 Neb. 112, 181 N.W.2d 261 (1970) (provision in a mortgage
assigning possession and rents to a mortgagee, effective upon default, is valid and
enforceable, and such provisions may be enforced in a foreclosure action upon
application of the mortgagee); Hanks v. State Bank, 143 Neb. 204, 9 N.W.2d 175
(1943) (parties to a mortgage may make arrangements as to the possession of the
premises other than those the law would determine in the absence of an agree-
ment); Felino v. Newcomb Lumber Co., 64 Neb. 335, 89 N.W. 755 (1902) (a provi-
sion in a real estate mortgage, that in the case of a default the mortgagee shall be
entitled to possession of the premises, is valid as to the parties and subsequent
purchasers and encumbrancers are chargeable with notice).
43. The Act implicitly recognizes that such conveyances will occur when reference is
made to the trustor or his successor in interest. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-
1002 (Supp. 1984). See generally G. OSBORNE, supra note 3, at § 5.1. However, the
trustor will remain personally liable for the underlying obligation, with a right of
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without the beneficiary's prior consent.44
recovery against his grantee dependent upon whether the transfer was taken sub-
ject to the debt, or whether the transferee assumed the obligation. Id at § 5.2.
44. Both mortgages and trust deeds commonly contain due-on-sale provisions which
allow the lender the option of declaring the entire debt due and payable in the
event that the debtor attempts to transfer the encumbered property without the
lender's prior consent. Due-on-sale clauses became popular with the instability of
long term interest rates. Such clauses were designed to eliminate assumable
loans and instead force a purchaser to negotiate a loan at the prevailing market
rate of interest. Additionally, such clauses allow the lender to regulate the type
of people that will own or occupy the encumbered premises. See generally G.
OSBORNE, supra note 3, at § 5.21.
Due-on-sale clauses have received a mixed reaction from the courts.
Although no court has held a due-on-sale clause to be per se unlawful as an inva-
lid restraint on alienation, such clauses have been closely scrutinized. Two gen-
eral methods of judicial treatment have emerged. The first approach recognizes
the validity of due-on-sale clauses, but places the burden on the lender to prove
that enforcement of the clause is reasonable. See, e.g., Martin v. People's Mut.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 319 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa 1982); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977); First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Kelly, 312 N.W.2d 476 (S.D. 1981).
In contrast, the predominant approach tends to allow automatic enforcement
of such clauses, and places the burden on the borrower to establish that enforce-
ment is unfair or unconscionable. See, e.g., Krause v. Columbia Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, - Colo. App. -, 631 P.2d 1158 (1981); Bingaman v. Valley Sav. & Loan, 97
N.M. 8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981); Redd v. Western Sav. & Loan Co., 646 P.2d 761 (Utah
1982). The courts following this approach recognize that public policy supports
protecting the mortgagee from variances in the interest rate charged on long-
term real estate loans.
The California courts have held that due-on-sale clauses are an unreasonable
restraint on the alienation of real propety and thus are not enforceable unless the
lender can demonstrate that enforcement is reasonably necessary to protect
against the impairment of its security, or is necessary to protect against the likeli-
hood of default. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d
970, 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385-86 (1978).
In 1976, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board issued regulations authorizing
the use of due-on-sale clauses by all federally chartered savings and loan associa-
tions. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1983). A similar regulation was issued by the Na-
tional Credit Union Administration in 1978 and was intended to apply to due-on-
sale clauses in federal credit union mortgages. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6(d) (1983). In-
terpreting these regulations, the lower federal courts have concluded that the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board had intended to preempt the application of state
due-on-sale law to federally chartered associations. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Myrick, 533 F. Supp. 1041 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Lindenberg v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ga. 1981), affd, 691 F.2d 974 (11th
Cir. 1982); Price v. Florida Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 524 F. Supp. 175 (M.D. Fla.
1981), affd, 707 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1983); Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978). In contrast, several state courts reached a
contrary result, and refused to enforce due-on-sale provisions. See Panko v. Pan
Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 119 Cal. App. 3d 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1981), va-
cated, 458 U.S. 1117 (1982); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d
156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 308 N.W. 2d 471 (Minn. 1981). The United States Supreme Court recently
addressed the conflict in Fidelity First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458
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The parties to a trust deed may expressly allocate responsibilities
in the trust instrument. Important provisions that should be agreed
upon include establishing responsibility for the payment of taxes and
assessments,45 insurance 46 and maintenance of the trust property,47 as
U.s. 141 (1982), wherein the Court found the federal regulations preempted state
law regulating due-on-sale clauses. The decision, however, did not address the
enforceability of due-on-sale clauses in mortgages executed prior to the effective
date of the regulations, nor did the decision extend to loans made by state
chartered institutions.
Due to the questions left unresolved by the Supreme Court in de la Cuesto,
Congress enacted the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. 12
U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1982). The Act expressly preempts state law restricting enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses. The Act applies to all lenders, including individuals,
Federal associations, state-chartered savings and loan associations, national and
state-chartered banks, credit unions, mortgage banks, and insurance companies.
See Preemption of State Due-on-Sale Law, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,561 (1983) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(g)). For an in-depth discussion of the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, see Barad & Layden, Due-on-Sale as Pre-
empted by the Garn-St Germain Act, 12 REAL EsTATE L.J. 138 (1983); Nelson &
Whitman, Congressional Preemption of Mortgage Due-on-Sale Law: An Analysis
of the Garn-St. Germain Act, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1983).
45. It is generally held that taxes assessed against mortgaged property should be dis-
charged by the mortgagor. See, e.g., Adams v. Sims, 177 Ark. 652, 9 S.W.2d 329
(1928); Hays v. Crawford, 159 Kan. 723, 158 P.2d 463 (1945); Williams v. Hilton, 35
Me. 547, 58 A.D. 729 (1853). As a trust deed is no different from a mortgage, the
same considerations that make a mortgagor responsible for taxes and assessments
would apply to the trustor. However, to ensure certainty, the parties to a trust
deed should specify whether it is the trustor or trustee who will be required to
pay taxes levied on the trust property.
In the event that the trustor fails to pay any taxes or assessments levied
against the trust property, the trustee should be entitled to make those payments
necessary to protect his security. The trustee would then be entitled to recover
all payments made from the trustor. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Bell, 59 Neb. 595, 81 N.W.
614 (1900); White v. Atlas Lumber Co., 49 Neb. 82, 68 N.W. 359 (1896); Johnson v.
Payne, 11 Neb. 269, 9 N.W. 81 (1881).
46. It is well established that both a mortgagor and a mortgagee have an insurable
interest in mortgaged property, and this proposition would be equally applicable
in the trust deed relationship. In the absence of a particular agreement, however,
a mortgagor is not obligated to insure the premises for the benefit of the mortga-
gee. United States Trust Co. v. Miller, 116 Neb. 25, 29, 215 N.W. 462, 464 (1927).
However, when the mortgage provides that the mortgagor will insure the prem-
ises for the benefit of the mortgagee, the mortgagee is entitled to be reimbursed
for any insurance premiums paid. Sanford v. Lichtenberger, 62 Neb. 501, 503, 87
N.W. 305, 306 (1901); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Butler, 57 Neb. 198, 201-
02,77 N.W. 667, 668 (1898); White v. Atlas Lumber Co., 49 Neb. 82, 87, 68 N.W. 359,
361 (1896).
The parties should allocate duties and responsibilities regarding insurance. At
a minimum, the trust deed should disclose the following with regard to insurance
maintained on the trust property: party responsible for the payment of premi-
ums; types and amounts of coverages to be purchased; insurer of the property;
whether the lender has a right to the proceeds; duties of the parties in the event
of a loss; application of proceeds to repair or payment of debt; which parties will
settle with the insurer, what will happen in the event that the borrower fails to
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well as any other obligations or conditions to which the parties
agree.48
A defaulting mortgagor in Nebraska has an equity of redemption
in his property at all times until the judicial sale has been confirmed.49
Accordingly, when the beneficiary of a trust deed elects judicial fore-
closure, the trustor would have the same redemption rights as a mort-
gagor.50 However, if the beneficiary elects to exercise a power of sale,
pay premiums; and release of the debtor's interest upon the exercise of a power of
sale foreclosure.
47. As a general rule a mortgagor may not commit acts of waste which would impair
the sufficiency of the lender's security. In Nebraska, a mortgagee has the right to
bring suit to prevent waste by a mortgagor in possession, when the security may
be impaired or when there is a danger that the mortgaged property may suffer a
loss in value to an amount below the amount of the debt secured. See, e.g.,
Vybiral v. Schildhauser, 130 Neb. 433, 438, 265 N.W. 241, 244 (1936) (cutting of
timber devalued property to less than the amount of the outstanding mortgage
note). The policy behind the rule prohibiting debtor waste would be equally ap-
plicable to a trust deed, so, a trustor would also be prohibited from committing
those acts which may impair the value of the trust property.
48. Items which should be considered by the drafter of a trust deed include: lenders
right to enter and inspect; disposition of proceeds upon condemnation; due-on-
sale provisions; due-on-encumbrance provisions; whether forebearance by lender
constitutes waiver of enforceable rights; methods and manner of giving notice;
parties who request notice; future advances; lender's right to possession or rents
and profits upon a failure to cure within the statutory time period; allocation of
the duty to defend in actions affecting the trust property; events constituting de-
fault; consequences of default; borrower's statutory right to cure defaults; acceler-
ation of the debt upon default; foreclosure by power of sale; acceptable manner of
payment by a purchaser at the trustee's sale; trustee's fees for the conduct of the
sale; and method of reconveyance. See generally 1 NEBRASKA CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, INC., REAL ESTATE CONVEYANCING SYSTEMS, IV-D-1 (1979).
Although the Act originally did not specifically authorize the use of future
advance clauses, the validity of such provisions was implicitly recognized when
reference was made to the debtor's right of reinstatement. See NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 76-1012 (1981). Most recently, the Act was amended to specifically authorize
future advances necessary to protect the security, and optional advances. L.B.
679, 88th Leg., 1st Sess., 1984 Neb. Laws § 17. Because it is now clear that future
advances are permissible under a trust deed, the question arises as to whether
Nebraska mortgage law would regulate their use. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238.01
(1981) (authorizes future advances in mortgages provided that the maximum
amount of the future advance is stated in the mortgage). Although the Nebraska
Supreme Court has indicated that the Trust Deeds Act is separate and distinct
from Nebraska mortgage law, there is no valid reason why future advances in
trust deeds should not be subject to the regulations imposed on such clauses by
Nebraska mortgage law. See supra notes 10 & 11.
49. See supra notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text.
50. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1005 (Supp. 1984): "[A] trust deed may be foreclosed in the
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property."
Since real property subject to a mortgage has an equity of redemption, it follows




the trustor would lose his equitable right of redemption.51 Instead,
the Act provides the trustor with a thirty-day period during which the
default may be cured and the debt reinstated,52 thereby protecting the
trustor from the loss of his property due to an inadvertent default.
B. Rights of the Trustee
Under the Act, only members of the Nebraska State Bar Associa-
tion or Nebraska licensed real estate brokers are authorized to serve
as trustees.53 The Act also permits several entities to serve as
trustee,54 including banks, building and loan associations, savings and
loan associations authorized to do business in Nebraska,5 5 and title in-
51. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1010(2) (1981).
52. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1012 (1981). See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
53. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1003(1)(a) (1981). The original draft of the Trust Deeds Act
provided that the only individuals that could act as a trustee were members of the
Nebraska State Bar Association. Political pressure resulted in the addition of
real estate brokers to the class of qualified trustees. The Act's proponents found
this acceptable, because brokers, like lawyers, were subject to state regulation.
Hearings on LB. 616, supra note 1, at 8. Although individual lawyers or real
estate brokers may serve as trustees, such authorization does not extend to law
firms or real estate agencies unless such entities are within the class of acceptable
trustees under the Act. Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that the trustee
qualifies under the Act.
54. Because an entity organized in the corporate form may have perpetual existence
whereas an individual may become incapacitated or leave the state, there might
appear to be distinct advantages in naming an entity as trustee. However, the Act
provides a simple procedure whereby a successor trustee may be appointed so
that perpetual existence need not be a major concern. See infra notes 72-77 and
accompanying text.
55. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1003(1)(b) (1981). The Act authorizes several financial insti-
tutions to serve as trustee, including any bank, building and loan associations, or
savings and loan associations authorized to do business in Nebraska under the
laws of the State or the United States. Financial institutions are permitted to act
as trustees because they are regulated quite extensively by state and federal agen-
cies. Furthermore, they have the expertise and resources to deal with trust deed
transactions. Absent from the class of authorized institutions are industrial loan
and investment companies, credit unions, and cooperative credit associations.
These lenders are also subject to extensive state and federal regulation, so that
policy considerations would support their inclusion in the class of authorized
trustees. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-401 to - 451 (1983) (industrial loan and invest-
ment company regulations); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-1760 to - 17,126 (1983) (credit
union regulations); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-1308 to - 1332 (1983) (cooperative credit
association regulations). See also 12 U.S.C. § 21 to 216(d) (1982) (reserve require-
ments for federally regulated banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1762 (1982) (reserve require-
ments for federally regulated credit unions).
Arguably, industrial loan and investment companies should qualify as trustees
even though not specifically authorized by the Act. The Act provides that any
bank authorized to do business in Nebraska may serve as a trustee. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 76-1003(1)(b) (1981). The Nebraska Banking Act defines the term "bank"
to include any incorporated banking institution which was formed under the laws
of this State as they existed prior to May 9, 1933, as well as any corporation duly
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surance companies5 6 and corporations authorized to conduct a trust
business in Nebraska.57 Additionally, banks, building and loan as-
sociations, savings and loan associations, and corporations authorized
to conduct trust businesses may serve both as trustee and beneficiary
under a single trust deed,58 while individuals and insurers are prohib-
ited from doing so.59
The Act creates a potential conflict of interest by permitting cer-
tain beneficiaries to serve as trustee for a single trust obligation. Be-
cause of this potential, several states have either prohibited the
beneficiary from assuming the duties of a trustee,60 or limited his rem-
edies upon default.61 Because the trustee's interest is similiar to that
of a mortgagee, arguably no conflict of interest arises when the benefi-
ciary serves in the dual capacity as trustee. However, because the
trustee, unlike a mortgagor, is permitted to dispose of the trust prop-
erty without a judicial sale, the potential for manipulation is in-
creased. In order to check the trustee's powers, the Act's drafters
granted the trustor an absolute right to cure default and reinstate the
debt. Further protection was afforded by limiting the beneficiary's
right to a deficiency judgment. Finally, the Act reduces the potential
organized under the laws of this State for the purpose of conducting a bank
within Nebraska under the provisions of §§ 8-101 to - 1,129 of the Nebraska Bank-
ing Act. NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-101(4) (1983). Included within the provisions of
§§ 8-101 to - 1,129 is the regulation of industrial loan and investment companies.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-401 to - 451 (1983). Therefore, by way of statutory construc-
tion, it appears that industrial loan and investment companies are authorized to
serve as trustees under the Trust Deeds Act.
56. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1003(1)(d) (1981).
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1003(1)(c) (1981).
58. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1003(2) (1981). An entity authorized to serve as trustee for a
trust deed in which it is also a beneficiary should have the expertise and re-
sources to manage the problems of trust deed administration. Furthermore, such
an entity is subject to extensive regulation, so that any concern about the possibil-
ity of manipulation should be dispelled due to this increased supervision. Finally,
such an entity will ordinarily be organized with perpetual existence, so that con-
tinuity and consistency is achieved in dealing with the trust deed transaction.
59. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1003(2) (1981). A major reason why individuals are prohib-
ited from serving both as trustee and beneficiary under a single trust deed is that
in the event of death or disability of the trustee, there would be no one available
to appoint a successor trustee or to compel delivery of the trust deed to a succes-
sor. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1004 (Supp. 1984). See also infra notes 72-77 and
accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 45-1502(1) (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. 6 71-1-303(1) (1983).
See also ORE. REV. STAT. § 86-705(1) (1983) (permits members of the Oregon Bar,
banks, trust companies, savings and loans, title insurance agencies, and escrow
agents to serve in dual capacity as trustee and beneficiary); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 61:24:020 (1982) (allows any agency of the federal government to serve as
trustee and beneficiary under single trust deed).
61. The Nebraska Trust Deeds Act provides some measure of protection for the trus-
tor by limiting the beneficiary's right to a deficiency judgment, so that it is unnec-
essary to prohibit the beneficiary from also acting as trustee.
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for manipulative practice by allowing only those entities subject to
state regulation to serve as both trustee and beneficiary. 62
A second potential conflict not addressed by the Act arises when an
attorney or real estate broker representing a beneficiary in the sale of
trust property is subsequently retained to serve as trustee for the
transaction. The individual who negotiated the sale arguably could
not serve as an impartial trustee for the parties.63 A minority of juris-
dictions have held that a trustee associated with a beneficiary is pro-
hibited from exercising a power of sale even though a power of sale
provision is included in the trust deed.64 In contrast, the majority of
the courts addressing this issue have refused to limit the trustee's
powers simply because of his prior relationship to one of the parties. 65
62. See supra note 54.
63. An attorney may violate the Code of Professional Responsibility if he represents
the beneficiary while acting as a trustee under a trust deed. Under the American
Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, three Canons are implicated:
the duty to represent a client zealously, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY Canon 7 (1983); the duty to exercise independent professional judgment,
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1983); and, the duty to
avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety, MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1983). It has been suggested that an interested
attorney should not serve as a trustee until an advisory opinion has been obtained
from the Nebraska State Bar Association. McClymont & Thompson, supra note
27, at 54.
64. This line of reasoning has been restricted to the Federal Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, which reasoned that the trustee owes a fiduciary duty to
both the trustor and beneficiary and must act impartially toward both. Thus,
where the son of a beneficiary acted as the trustee for a trust deed, it was held
that he could not serve in such a capacity in the foreclosure suit. Kent v. Living-
stone, 83 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1936). See also Admiral Co. v. Thomas, 271 F.2d 849
(D.C. Cir. 1959) (where officer of trustee of first trust deed made bid on trustee's
behalf and effect of sale eliminated security of second trust deed without notice,
second trustee may set aside sale); Earll v. Picken, 113 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1940)
(breach of trust for trustee to purchase second trust deed note at a discount and
attempt to foreclose without consent of court or beneficiaries); Spruill v. Ballard,
58 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (trustee must act fairly and in best interests of both
parties); Holman v. Ryon, 56 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (trustee should scrupu-
lously avoid placing himself in a position in which his interests might conflict
with the interests of those whom he represents).
65. The majority position is that the trustee is not a fiduciary of the parties, but is
under a duty to act fairly in his dealings with the parties. Thus, when the trustee
was both an officer and large shareholder in the beneficiary entity, it did not
disqualify him from also acting as trustee. See Dali v. Lindsey, 237 S.W.2d 1006,
1008 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). See also Witter v. Bank of Milpitas, 204 Cal. 570,269 P.
614 (1928) (an officer of bank- the beneficiary under the trust deed-is not dis-
qualified from acting as a trustee under the instrument); Copsey v. Sacramento
Bank, 133 Cal. 659, 66 P. 7 (1901) (rule that trustees are forbidden to purchase at
their own sale, and that such purchases are generally void, does not apply in ex-
ceptional cases of powers of sale under mortgages); Dollar Inv. Co. v. Paton, 236
Md. 94, 202 A.2d 646 (1964) (although inadvertence or error, trust deeds not inva-
lid because trustee and obligee named on deed were the same corporate entity);
Graham & Locke Inv. Co. v. Madison, 295 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (while
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Because of the safeguards provided for a trustor under the Nebraska
Act, it would be unnecessary to impose any further restrictions on the
trustee who may be associated in some manner with the beneficiary.6 6
However, in the event that a power of sale foreclosure is elected, the
interested trustee should resign and allow the beneficiary to appoint
an impartial successor trustee, so as to avoid any subsequent
challenge.
For his services, the trustee is entitled to a fee, which is assessed to
the borrower or lender, depending upon local practice.6 7 Although
the Act limits the amount that a trustee may charge when a trust deed
is reinstated following default,68 it provides no other regulation on the
amount of the trustee's fee. 69 As the Nebraska Act relegates the
trustee to a relatively minor role in the trust deed relationship, the fee
should be nominal.70 Moreover, competition among various institu-
tions should serve to keep the trustee's fee at a reasonably low level.71
If for any reason the trustee is unwilling or unable to serve in his
capacity as trustee, or if the beneficiary for any reason wishes to name
a new trustee, the Act authorizes the beneficiary to appoint a succes-
sor trustee.7 2 Thus if the trustee dies, leaves the State, or otherwise is
notes securing trust deed void as being usurious, agreement to pay principal not
rendered unenforceable, foreclosure not a nullity). Additionally, at least one
state has authorized the interested attorney to act as trustee by statute. See ORE.
REV. STAT. § 86.790(1)(d) (1983).
66. Extensive notice requirements and limitations on the amount of recoverable defi-
ciency judgment provide adequate safeguards for the trustor. See infra notes 103-
08 & 164-72.
67. At the Act's inception, it was assumed that the cost of the trustee's fee would be
treated no differently than the cost of obtaining a mortgage. Hearings on LB.
616, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of Mr. Albert R. Stelling, Vice Pres., Omaha
Nat'l Bank).
68. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1012 (1981) (trustee's fee may not exceed $50.00, or one-half
of one percent of the entire unpaid principal, whichever is greater).
69. Apparently the Legislature wanted to avoid problems that could arise if it at-
tempted to establish regulations on the amount of the trustee's fee. Hearings on
L.B. 616, supra note 1, at 6-7 (statement of Theodore Kessner).
70. Id at 10 (statement of Senator Bauer). The trustee has few duties under the Act,
except in the event of default or when the note secured by the trust deed is paid
in full. See infra notes 91-97 & 98-102.
71. One concern was that the trustee's fees would become too expensive. Proponents
of the Act argued that competition, as well as the fact that the trustee plays a
relatively minor role under the Act, would tend to keep trustee's fees nominal.
Hearings on the L.B. 616, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of Albert R. Stelling, Vice
President, Omaha Nat'l Bank). It has been suggested, however, that there is no
competition in Nebraska among those persons qualified to serve as trustees. The
Article faults the Trust Deeds Act for the general lack of qualified trustees, and
concludes that banks or other financial institutions will serve as trustees only in
the event that one of their own loans is involved in the transaction. McClymont
& Thompson, supra note 27, at 54.
72. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1004(1) (Supp. 1984). The Act provides that a beneficiary
may appoint a successor trustee at any time. The beneficiary does not have to
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unavailable to perform his duties, the Act provides a relatively simple
procedure whereby the beneficiary may appoint a successor. In order
to name a successor trustee, the beneficiary must mail a notice of sub-
stitution to the trustee and to all persons entitled to receive a notice of
default under the terms of the trust deed.73 After mailing the notice
of substitution, the beneficiary must file the notice with the register of
deeds in the county in which the trust property is located.74 The Act
does not require the original trustee to convey title to a successor.75
Rather, upon compliance with all notice and recording requirements,
the successor is deemed to acquire all rights and title held by the origi-
nal trustee,7 6 and has the capacity to convey good title to a subsequent
purchaser of the trust property.77
Beyond establishing the duties of a trustee relating to the exercise
of the power of sale, 78 the Act fails to clearly define the rights and
show cause for the removal of the original trustee, even though such a removal
may constitute breach of contract.
73. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1004(3) (Supp. 1984).
74. The notice of substitution must identify the original parties to the trust deed, the
date and place where the trust deed was recorded, and the name of the new
trustee. The notice must be executed and acknowledged by all of the benefi-
ciaries under the trust deed, or their successors in interest. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-
1004(2) (Supp. 1984). Before recording the notice of substitution, the beneficiary
must attach affidavits to the notice stating that copies of the notice have been sent
to all persons to whom a copy of notice of default should be sent. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 76-1004(3) (Supp. 1984). Furthermore, the notice of substitution must contain
or be attached to an acknowledgement, signed by the trustee being replaced, that
attests to the receipt of a copy of the notice of substitution. Alternatively, the
beneficiary must file an affidavit stating that the trustee was personally served
with a copy or that service was accomplished by publication and mailing. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1004(4) (Supp. 1984). For a copy of the approved form of notice of
substitution of trustee, see Appendix.
75. If the Act were to require the original trustee to convey trust property title to a
successor trustee, there would be great deal of confusion upon the death or inca-
pacity of the original trustee. Such a requirement would result in title defects,
since in the absence of the original trustee, a stranger to the chain of title would
have to execute a deed to the successor trustee. This point was raised at the Act's
inception. Hearings on L.B. 616, supra note 1.
76. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1004(1) (Supp. 1984).
77. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1004(5) (Supp. 1984). Any affidavits contained in or at-
tached to the notice of substitution of trustee constitute prima facie evidence of
compliance with the notice requirements for the substitution of trustee. As to
bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value, such statements constitute
conclusive evidence of compliance with all requirements for a valid substitution
of trustee. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1004(5) (Supp. 1984).
78. Specific duties imposed on the trustee by the Act include: recording all notices of
default, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1006 (Supp. 1984); recording all notices of sale, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1006 (Supp. 1984); mailing all notices of default or sale to the
parties entitled thereto, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1008 (Supp. 1984); publication of
notice of sale, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1007 (1981); conducting the public sale of the
trust property, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1009 (1981); executing the trustee's deed to
the purchaser at the trustee's sale, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1010(1) (1981); distribut-
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obligations of a trustee. In the absence of statutory authority, the is-
sue arises as to what duty of care the trustee owes to the trustor and
the beneficiary. While some jurisdictions have recognized that a
trustee owes a fiduciary duty to both,79 the prevailing view is that the
trustee has a duty to act in good faith so as to preserve the interests of
all parties to the trust instrument.8 0 As such, the trustee can not act
exclusively for the benefit of either the trustor or beneficiary, and in-
stead must measure his actions so as to protect the interests of both.
Prior to the enactment of the Trust Deeds Act, Nebraska recog-
nized that a trustee's duty of care was to be determined by reference
to the trust instrument.8 1 Where the trust agreement clearly defined
the rights and obligations of the parties thereto, it was held that the
agreement would control in establishing the trustee's duty of care.
Although the trust deed could contain provisions limiting the trustee's
liability for acts done in good faith,82 the trustee could not be excul-
ing the proceeds of the sale, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1011 (Supp. 1984); recording all
cancellations of notices of default as may be necessary, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1012
(1981); and conveying the trust property back to the trustor upon satisfaction of
the debt, NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1014 (1981).
In the event that the trustee fails to record a cancellation of notice of default
or reconvey the trust property upon the trustor's full payment of the debt, the
Act provides the trustor with alternative remedies of specific performance or an
action for damages. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1012, to - 1014 (1981). Beyond these
remedies, however, the Act does not provide an explicit remedy for either trustor
or beneficiary in the event that the trustee fails to perform his duties. Thus, an
aggrieved trustor would be free to bring an action to compel compliance with the
Act, whereas a beneficiary has the additional option of removing the trustee and
appointing a successor.
79. Admiral Co. v. Thomas, 271 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Earll v. Picken, 113 F.2d 150
(D.C. Cir. 1940); Kent v. Livingstone, 83 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Spruill v. Bal-
lard, 58 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Holman v. Ryon, 56 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
Imposing a fiduciary duty on the trustee, with its resulting higher standards of
care, may be unreasonable in light of the fact that the trustee was intended to
play a relatively minor role in the trust deed transaction. Hearings on LB. 616,
supra note 1, at 10 (closing statement of Senator Bauer).
80. See, e.g., Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Steamship Westhampton, 358
F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1965); Federal Home Loan Bank v. Long Beach Fed. Sav. &
Loan, 122 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. Cal. 1954); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Chief Wash
Co., 386 Ill. 146, 13 N.E.2d 153 (1938); White v. MacQueen, 360 Ill. 236, 195 N.E. 832
(1935); Weimer v. Havana Nat'l Bank, 67 Ill. App.3d 882, 385 N.E.2d 340 (1979);
Huffman v. Gould, 327 Ill. App.2d 428, 64 N.E.2d 773 (1945); Krug v. Bremer, 316
Mo. 891, 292 S.W. 702 (1927); Charles Green Real Est. Co. v. St. Louis Mut. Bldg.
Co., 196 Mo. 358, 93 S.W. 1111 (1906).
81. E.g., Refshague v. Sesostris Temple, 139 Neb. 775, 298 N.W. 755, reh'g denied, 140
Neb. 706, 1 N.W.2d 320 (1941).
82. See Fleener v. Omaha Nat'l Co., 131 Neb. 253, 267 N.W. 462 (1936). Fleener in-
volved a trust deed that contained a provision allowing the trustee to accelerate
all payments due upon default. Upon the debtor's default, the trustor failed to
invoke the acceleration clause, and instead allowed the debtor to make late pay-
ments. The beneficiaries sued the trustee, claiming the trustee had an absolute
duty to enforce the acceleration clause. The court found that the trust deed did
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exculpated for intentional wrongs or acts of gross negligence.8 3 Addi-
tionally, the law imposes duties on the trustee independent of the
terms of the trust agreement.84 For example, it has been held that the
trustee is under a duty to give notice to the beneficiary of any matter
material to the trust relationship.8 5 Therefore, the trustee must look
first to the express terms of the trust instrument, and then to the com-
mon law, in order to measure the obligation to trustor and beneficiary.
C. Transfer, Assignment, and Reconveyance of The Trust Deed
The Act provides that the transfer of an obligation secured by a
trust deed operates as a transfer of the security.8 6 When a beneficiary
transfers or assigns his interests in a note secured by a trust deed, the
assignee thus assumes all rights and responsibilities under the trust
deed.87 The Act further provides that the assignment of any interest
in a trust deed may be recorded.8 8 However, merely recording the as-
signment of an interest does not operate to place a trustor on notice of
the transaction, and will not invalidate any payments made by the
trustor to the person holding the note that the trust deed secures.8 9
not require immediate acceleration, but allowed the trustee to exercise his own
business judgment in using the acceleration clause. The court concluded that
under the circumstances, the trustee was not liable for a mistake of sound busi-
ness judgment. In support of its decision, the court relied on a provision in the
trust deed which allowed that as long as the trustee acted in good faith and exer-
cised reasonable prudence and care in the administration of the trust deed, the
trustee would not be liable for any losses sustained by the beneficiaries.
83. AL at 257, 267 N.W. at 466.
84. It is recognized that beyond the terms of the trust deed, the trustee owes the
beneficiary good faith and ordinary vigilance in protecting the beneficiary's inter-
ests. See, e.g., Newlander v. Riverview Realty Co., 238 Wis. 211, 298 N.W. 603
(1941); Marshall &fllsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 250 N.W. 862
(1933).
85. Streight v. First Trust Co., 133 Neb. 340, 275 N.W. 278 (1937); Fleener v. Omaha
Nat'l Co., 131 Neb. 253, 267 N.W. 462 (1936); First Trust Co. v. Carlsen, 129 Neb.
118, 261 N.W. 333 (1935). Where it appears that a trustee has practiced conceal-
ment, evasion, or misrepresentation, thereby depriving the beneficiary of mate-
rial information relative to the trust, the trustee, as well as the persons
participating in the deception, may be required to respond in damages. Id. at 128-
29, 261 N.W. at 337.
86. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1016 (1981).
87. The Act follows Nebraska mortgage law, which recognizes that the debt is the
principal concern while a mortgage is merely incidental, so that when a debt is
transferred to an assignee, the assignee also receives a corresponding interest in
the security. See Frerking v. Thomas, 64 Neb. 193, 89 N.W. 1005 (1902); Anderson
v. Kreidler, 56 Neb. 171, 76 N.W. 581 (1898); Eggert v. Beyer, 43 Neb. 711, 62 N.W.
57 (1895); Waddle v. Owen, 43 Neb. 489, 61 N.W. 731 (1895); Whipple v. Fowler, 41
Neb. 675, 60 N.W. 15 (1894); Daniels v. Densmore, 32 Neb. 40, 48 N.W. 906 (1891);
Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. McGurger, 20 Neb. 500, 30 N.W. 686 (1886).
88. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1017 (1981).
89. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1017 (1981). The Act follows Nebraska mortgage law in pro-
viding that recording an assignment alone does not operate to place the trustor on
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Instead, the trustor is entitled to actual notice of such an event.
Although the Act does not require the recording of an assignment of
interest, all assignments should be recorded as a matter of practice, so
as to maintain a clear chain of title.90
When the underlying obligation secured by a trust deed has been
satisfied, the trustee must, upon written request by the beneficiary,
execute a trustee's deed to convey legal title in the trust property back
to the trustor.9 1 Although a trustee's deed purports to convey title to
the trustor, it should have the same effect as the recording of a release
of a mortgage.92 The trustor may be identified in the trustee's deed by
name as the grantee.93 Alternatively, if the trust property has been
sold during the term of the trust relationship, the grantee may be
identified as "the person or persons entitled to the trust property."94
In addition to the trustee's deed, the beneficiary must also deliver to
the trustor, or to his successor in interest, the note or other evidence
of indebtedness for which the trust deed was given.9 5 If the benefici-
ary fails to deliver such documents within thirty days of a written de-
mand by the trustor, suit may be brought for damages or to compel
reconveyance. 96 The Act thus tracks the Nebraska procedure for the
notice of such assignments. See NEBR. REV. STAT. § 76-256 (1981). See also
Shriver v. Sims, 127 Neb. 374, 378-79, 255 N.W. 60, 63 (1934) (merely recording
assignment of mortgage does not put mortgagor on notice so as to invalidate pay-
ments made to the mortgagee).
90. Although assignments should be recorded, there is one instance when it is essen-
tial to record an assignment of the debt. If a trustee were to be substituted after
the transfer of a beneficiary's interest, the record would allow only the assigning
beneficiary to make the substitution of trustee when the parties fail to record the
assignment. Since only a beneficiary of record may make a substitution of
trustee, it would be difficult for the assignee to request such a substitution.
Therefore, to preserve a clear title in the event of a subsequent substitution of
trustee, it is advisable to record all assignments of interests in the debt.
91. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1014 (1981).
92. As the trustee's interest in the trust property is similar to a lien held by a mortga-
gee, the trustee's deed should do nothing more than operate as a release does
under mortgage law. Hearings on L.B. 616, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Mr.
Theodore Kessner).
93. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1014 (1981).
94. Id. In most cases, the grantee named in the trustee's deed would be the original
trustor. However, if the trustor sold the property, then he could not be named as
the grantee in the trustee's deed. Anticipating sales during the term of the trust
deed, the Act provides that the trustee's deed may contain:general language iden-
tifying the grantee, in order to eliminate any title problems upon reconveyance
by the trustee.
95. The Act requires the beneficiary, rather than the trustee, to deliver the trustee's
deed and the note secured by the trust deed. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1014 (1981).
This follows from the proponents' desire to keep the trustee's responsibilities to a
minimum, so that the trust deed relationship closely resembles a mortgage. See
supra note 79.
96.. The Act provides the trustor with two alternative remedies in the event that the
beneficiary fails to obtain a deed of reconveyance. The trustor may bring an ac-
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release of a mortgagee's interests in mortgaged property.97
IV. DEFAULT
If the trustor defaults on the underlying obligation during the term
of the trust deed relationship9s the beneficiary may pursue one of
three alternative courses of action. The Act provides: (1) the benefici-
ary may foreclose the trust deed in the manner provided by law for
the foreclosure of mortgages on real property;99 (2) the beneficiary
may bring an action at law on the note for the recovery of the debt;100
tion for damages resulting from such a refusal. Alternatively, the Act authorizes
suit to compel reconveyance of the trust property wherein the trustor may re-
cover the costs of maintaining the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, as
well as all damages resulting from the refusal of the beneficiary to obtain a
trustee's deed. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1014 (1981). It is hard to foresee a case in
which a trustor would bring an action for damages, since the Act provides the
alternative remedy of specific performance coupled with the recovery of damages
and attorney's fees.
97. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-255 (1981). The statute provides that a release must be
recorded by a mortgagee within seven days of the receipt of a request for release.
If the mortgagee fails to comply, the mortgagor may recover $100.00 plus all ac-
tual damages incurred.
98. Because a trust deed is a contract, the parties should clearly delineate the items
constituting default and the remedies of beneficiary. See supra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text.
99. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1005 (Supp. 1984). Although the primary purpose of the
Trust Deeds Act was to provide lenders with a security device whereby a power
of sale could be exercised, there may be instances when judicial foreclosure
would be elected over the exercise of a power of sale. Foreclosure might be pre-
ferred when a judicial resolution of a dispute is desired. Furthermore, judicial
foreclosure might be the only means of establishing a marketable title by resolv-
ing the interests of the parties in an adversary proceeding. It has been suggested
there might be specific instances where foreclosure would be preferred over the
power of sale: when the parties contest the amount due under the obligation;
when a dispute arises as to whether the trust deed was in default; and, when the
relative priorities of junior lienors is in dispute. McClymont & Thompson, supra
note 27, at 51.
If the beneficiary elects to foreclose the borrower's interests, he has 10 years
from the date that the cause of action accrued to initiate foreclosure proceedings.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-202 (Supp. 1982). In contrast, the Trust Deeds Act provides
that a trustee's sale must be held within the period of time prescribed by law for
the commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust deed. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1015 (1981). Ordinarily, the underlying obligation would be a
note, so that Nebraska law would provide a five-year statute of limitations. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-205 (Supp. 1983). If the event giving rise to the default is more
than five years old, the beneficiary must elect judicial foreclosure of the trust
deed.
100. Nebraska case law has long recognized that a mortgagee may either initiate fore-
closure proceedings in equity or bring an action at law on the note. See, e.g., Max-
well v. Home Fire Ins. Co., 57 Neb. 207, 77 N.W. 681 (1898); Grable v. Beatty, 56
Neb. 642, 77 N.W. 49 (1889).
The remedies afforded a mortgagee are independent, separate, and distinct.
Linder v. Terre Haute Brewing Co., 139 Neb. 636, 637, 298 N.W. 545, 546 (1941);
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or (3) the beneficiary may exercise a power of sale foreclosure if the
trustor has signed a written acknowledgement consenting to it at the
time the trust deed was executed, and if such a right was expressly
reserved in the trust deed.101 Each remedy must be pursued in strict
Federal Farm Mortgage Co. v. Thiele, 137 Neb. 626, 632, 290 N.W. 471, 474 (1940).
A mortgagee is prohibited from pursuing both remedies concurrently, and in-
stead must exhaust one remedy before resorting to the other. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-2140 (1979). The statute provides that once a foreclosure action is instituted,
a mortgagee is prohibited from maintaining an action at law during the pendency
of the foreclosure action. Moreover, Nebraska law provides that if the mortgagee
elects to maintain an action at law on the note, then it is prohibited from initiat-
ing foreclosure proceedings in equity until it exhausts its remedy at law. Thus,
once the mortgagee obtains a judgment on the note, it cannot bring a foreclosure
action until it is shown that the mortgagor has no other property against which to
execute. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2143 (1979). The statutory prohibition against con-
current actions prevents the prosecution of proceedings at law to recover on the
debt concurrent with proceedings in equity to foreclose the mortgage, and thus
eliminates the possibility of the debtor defending two suits. The rule also elimi-
nates the possibility that two judgments could be rendered against the debtor on
the same debt. See Federal Farm Mortgage Co. v. Adams, 142 Neb. 202, 207, 5
N.W.2d 384, 386-87 (1942) (statute requiring petition for foreclosure, to state
whether any proceedings have been bad at law, is for protection of debtor and to
prevent probability of two judgments against him on the same debt); Linder v.
Terre Haute Brewing Co., 139 Neb. 636, 637, 298 N.W. 545, 546 (1941) (action to
recover money judgment on note secured by mortgage is "action at law," in-
dependent from "suit in equity" to foreclose and satisfy the mortgage, even if an
attachment is issued and levied on the realty in a proceeding ancillary to the ac-
tion on the note); Federal Farm Mortgage Co. v. Claussen, 138 Neb. 518, 520, 293
N.W. 424, 426 (1940) (purpose of statute is to protect debtor and prevent prosecu-
tion at law to recover the debt concurrently with proceedings to foreclose the
mortgage, and to prevent two judgments being rendered against the debtor on the
same debt); Federal Farm Mortgage Co. v. Thiele, 137 Neb. 626, 290 N.W. 424
(1940); Federal Farm Mortgage Co. v. Cramb, 137 Neb. 553, 557, 290 N.W. 440, 443
(1940) (suit on a note secured by real estate mortgage is suit at law independent,
separate and distinct from suit in equity to foreclose and set aside a mortgage).
The Nebraska prohibition against concurrent actions does not operate to limit
the lender's choice of remedies. Rather, the law specifies that once a remedy is
chosen, the lender must pursue it to exhaustion. Nor does the rule operate to
deny a deficiency judgment. If upon the completion of a foreclosure suit the debt
has not been fully satisfied, the mortgagee is then permitted to initiate an action
on the note for any deficiency. See, e.g., Federal Farm Mortgage Co. v. Claussen,
138 Neb. 518, 520, 293 N.W. 424, 425-26 (1940) (statute does not deny the mortga-
gee the right to maintain an action at law to recover judgment for the deficiency);
Federal Farm Mortgage Co. v. Thiele, 137 Neb. 626, 630, 290 N.W. 471, 473-74
(1940) (there was no agreement that the mortgagee would look only to the realty
for statisfaction of the loan, therefore, statute did not deprive the mortgagee of
right to pursue deficiency judgment).
101. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1005 (Supp. 1984). The most crucial section of the Nebraska
Trust Deeds Act expressly conditions the exercise of a power of sale on the disclo-
sure of two provisions. The beneficiary must obtain a written acknowledgement
from the trustor stating that the trustor understands the document to be exe-
cuted is a trust deed and not a mortgage, and that his rights thereunder differ
substantial from those under a mortgage. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1005(2) (Supp.
[Vol. 64:92
NEBRASKA TRUST DEEDS
compliance with the controlling statutory procedure.1 02
If the beneficiary elects to foreclose the trustor's interests by exer-
1984). The beneficiary must also specifically reserve a power of sale in the trust
deed. Id. Since the primary purpose of using a trust deed is to provide the lender
with a power of sale, these disclosures should never be omitted.
102. If the beneficiary of a trust deed elects judicial foreclosure, it is clear that a con-
current action on the note would be prohibited. See supra note 100. Although
there is no Nebraska authority on this point, since mortgage law controls judicial
foreclosure of a trust deed, the rule against concurrent actions should apply.
However, if the beneficiary elects to exercise a power of sale, it is not clear
whether a concurrent action on the note would be prohibited. This uncertainty
springs from the fact that the Trust Deeds Act, unlike Nebraska mortgage law,
contains no express prohibition against concurrent actions. In contrast, the pro-
hibition against concurrent actions is quite specific under mortgage law. Id. The
prevailing rule is that in the absence of specific statutory prohibitions, the power
of sale may be exercised concurrently with a suit on the note. See, e.g., Ober v.
Gallagher, 93 U.S. 199, 208 (1876) (holder of a note secured by a mortgage may
proceed at law and in equity at same time, until he obtains actual satisfaction of
debt); Foothills Holding Corp. v. Tulsa Rig, Reel, & Mfg. Co., 155 Colo. 232, 234-
35, 393 P.2d 749, 751 (1964) (upon failure to discharge the obligation, the remedies
of suit on the note and foreclosure may be maintained concurrently). See also
Pico, Inc. v. Mickel, 138 Ga. App. 856, 857, 230 S.E.2d 488, 490 (1976) (a creditor,
who holds a promissory note secured by a deed, is not put to an election of reme-
dies as to whether he shall sue on the note or exercise a power of sale contained
in the deed, but he may due either or pursue both remedies concurrently until
the debt is satisfied); Barchard v. Kohn, 157 Ill. 579, 587, 41 N.E. 902, 904 (1895) (a
mortagee may sue upon the note or bring ejectment or file a bill in chancery to
foreclose, and may pursue such remedies concurrently or successively); Porter v.
Alamocitos Land & Livestock Co., 32 N.M. 344, 353, 256 P. 179, 183 (1927) (holder
of a note secured by mortgagee may successively or concurrently sue upon it);
French v. May, 484 S.W.2d 420, 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (a lienholder may con-
duct a nonjudicial foreclosure under a deed of trust while the suit on the note is
pending if the foreclosure of the law is sought in the pending action).
An analysis of policy considerations supporting the rule against concurrent
actions under mortgage law indicates that the same considerations do not exist
when a power of sale is exercised. Such considerations include: protecting the
mortgagor from the burden of defending two suits on the same debt; and protect-
ing the mortgagor from the possibility that two judgments might be rendered
against him on the same debt. Federal Farm Mortgage Co. v. Claussen, 138 Neb.
518, 520, 293 N.W. 424, 426 (1940). As the trustee's sale does not involve judicial
action, there would be but one suit for the trustor to defend, and but one judg-
ment that could be entered against the trustor.
Analagous case law tends to support the position that the rule against concur-
rent actions should not apply when the trustee utilizes a power of sale foreclo-
sure. See Luikart v. Bank of Benkelman, 132 Neb. 501, 503, 272 N.W. 324, 325
(1937) (in suit brought to foreclose a contract which was not a mortgage, it was
held that because the instrument was not a formal mortgage, the statutory prohi-
bition against concurrent actions did not apply). ,ee also Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.
Ohrt, 131 Neb. 858, 865, 270 N.W. 497, 501 (1936); Dimick v. Grand Island Banking
Co., 37 Neb. 394, 399, 55 N.W. 1066, 1068 (1893). In Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.
v. Leahy, 125 Neb. 644, 251 N.W. 278 (1933), the court examined a suit to foreclose
installment land contract. The plaintiff failed to comply with a statute requiring
pleading that no concurrent action at law was maintained, and the court held that
the statutory prohibition against concurrent actions applies only to formal mort-
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cising a power of sale, he must forward his request to the trustee along
with a summary of the events which constitute default. Before a sale
may be held, however, the trustee must comply with the Act's exten-
sive notice requirements. The trustee must first record a notice of de-
fault with the register of deeds in the county where the trust property
is located. 03 The notice must describe the trust deed by identifying
the trustor as well as the trust property, and must specify where the
trust deed is recorded.1 04 Furthermore, the notice of default must
contain a statement that an oligation has been breached, describe the
nature of the breach, and declare that an election has been made to
sell the trust property to satisfy the obligation.OS Within ten days of
recording the notice of default, the trustee must mail a copy of the
notice to each person who has made a formal request to receive notice
of default.10 In the event that the trustor has failed to request a no-
gages and not to mortgages or liens arising out of the equities between the parties.
Id. at 645, 251 N.W. at 279.
103. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1006 (Supp. 1984). The Act provides that "the trustee shall
first file for record in the office of the register of deeds of each county wherein
the trust property or some part or parcel thereof is situated, a notice of default
... " Id In the event that the trust property involves a large tract of land
located within the boundries of more than one county, the Act states the trustee
must file in each county where some parcel of the trust property may be found.
104. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1006 (Supp. 1984).
105. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1006 (Supp. 1984). The notice of default serves to put the
trustor, as well as those claiming an interest in the trust property through him,
on notice that a breach has occurred so that action may be taken to cure the
breach. The trustee must advance specific allegations of default, so that junior
leinors may fully evaluate their options for curing the default.
The notice of default should also serve a purpose similar to that served by the
lis pendens in mortgage law. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-531 (1979). Any party ac-
quiring an interest in the trust property after the recordation of the notice would
be on notice of the fact that a default had occurred and that the trustor's interest
is threatened.
106. NE . REV. STAT. § 76-1008 (Supp. 1984). The trustee is required to send a notice of
default to those persons who have recorded a formal request for notice of default
prior to the date that the trustee records the notice. A request for notice of de-
fault may be made in the trust deed, or in a subsequent filing with the register of
deeds. The request must contain the name and address of each person desiring
notice of default, and must identify the trust deed by stating the names of the
original parties thereto, the date of its filing, and the book and page where the
trust deed is recorded. Md For statutory form for request of notice of default, see
Appendix.
Since the trustee is required to mail the notice of default to only those persons
who have recorded a formal request, a junior lienor or encumbrancer should al-
ways record a request for notice of default. Such a request will protect his inter-
ests by allowing him the opportunity to cure a default and avert the sale of the
trust property.
If the trustor or junior lienor has had a change of address since the date that
the original request was filed, a new request should be filed with the register of
deeds. This is because the Act only requires that the trustee mail a notice of
default to the address listed within the recorded requests. It would appear that
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tice of default, the Act requires the trustee to give such notice by pub-
lication.107 After giving all notices of default, the trustee must then
wait one month before proceeding to exercise the power of sale. Dur-
ing this period, the trustor is allowed an opportunity to cure the
defaultos
The trustor's right of reinstatement is one of the unique features of
the Trust Deeds Act. The Act provides that the trustor may cure a
default and reinstate the obligation by paying all arrearages, other
than that portion of the principal which would not then be due had
the trustee discharges his obligation under the Act if notice was mailed to a rec-
ord address, and there is no requirement that the interested party actually re-
ceive a notice of default. See, e.g., Lupechino v. Carvahal, 35 Cal. App. 3d 742, 751,
111 Cal. Rptr. 112, 117 (1973) (neither trustee nor beneficiary is under a duty to
keep tract of a trustor's address so that notice of default mailed and returned
marked "moved, not forwardable" was sufficient notice); Strutt v. Ontario Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 28 Cal. App. 3d 866, 878, 105 Cal. Rptr. 395, 403 (1972) (sending notice
to address in recorded request is sufficient even if returned as undeliverable);
Evarts v. Meyers, 112 Cal. App. 2d 210, 211, 245 P.2d 1119, 1120 (1952) (when ad-
dressee refused to accept mailed notice and it was returned "refused and un-
claimed" addressee was held to have had notice of sale); Dillard v. Broyles, 633
S.W.2d 636, 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (service is complete upon deposit in mail, so
that trustee is under no duty to inquire as to a change of address when letter is
returned unclaimed); Martinez v. Beasley, 616 S.W.2d 689, 690 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981) (regardless of whether it was actually received, a certified letter mailed to a
debtor's residence was sufficient notice of trustee's intent to foreclose).
107. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1008 (Supp. 1984). The Act provides that if no trustor's ad-
dress is set forth in the trust deed and if no request for notice by such trustor has
been recorded, then the trustee must give notice of default by publication. Notice
must be published at least three times (once a week for three consecutive weeks)
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the trust property is
located, commencing not later than 10 days after the filing of notice of default.
Id-
The Act should be amended to limit the trustee's ability to exercise a power of
sale foreclosure upon notice by publication, and should instead condition the sale
upon receipt of actual notice by the trustor and all junior encumbrancers. Be-
cause of potentially severe consequences of an inadvertent default, the trustee
should be required to serve the trustor and junior lienors with actual notice of
default. The Act could adopt a method of notice that parallels Nebraska's service
by process procedure, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-505.01 (Supp. 1984), and could restrict
notice by publication to those instances where actual notice is not feasable. In
such cases, the trustee should be required to obtain a court order authorizing such
notice. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-518.01 (Supp. 1984).
108. The Act fails to expressly prohibit the debtor's waiver of notice provisions in the
trust deed or debt instrument. Because the protections afforded by the trustor's
right to cure defaults are conditioned upon the trustor's receipt of notice of de-
fault, the Act should be amended to prohibit such waivers. If the trustor were to
be permitted to waive his right to notice of default, the statutory right to cure
would be meaningless.
Even if the trust deed were to contain provisions waiving the trustor's right to
notice of default, the beneficiary should insist that the trustee nonetheless com-
ply with the notice provisions of the Act. Compliance should ensure the market-
ability of the trust property following issuance of the trustee's deed.
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default not occurred.0 9 In addition, the trustor must pay the costs
and expenses actually incurred by the beneficiary in enforcing the de-
fault, as well as all trustee's fees incurred due to the default.1no In
contrast, a defaulting mortgagor must generally pay the entire out-
standing balance of the underlying obligation in order to redeem the
property and avoid a judicial sale.t11
If the trustor cures a default within the statutory period, all pro-
ceedings that may have been instituted must be dismissed, and the
trust deed will remain in effect as if no default had occurred.11 2 Fur-
thermore, the trustee must, upon the request of any person having an
interest in the trust property, record a cancellation of the notice of
default so that the title to the trust property remains clear.113
If the trustor fails to cure the default within one month after re-
ceiving the notice of a default, the trustee must give notice of sale.
109. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1012 (1981). Although the Act provides the trustor with the
right to cure a default, it does not impose an obligation on the trustee to inform
the trustor of his right to cure a default and reinstate the debt. In California, for
example, the trustee is required by statute to mail a statement to any person who
has requested notice of default which informs that person of his right to cure the
default. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924c(b)(1) (West 1982). Such a practice should be con-
sidered by Nebraska lawmakers, as it operates to ensure that the trustor is fully
apprised of his right to cure yet imposes no additional burden on the trustee.
110. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1012 (1981). If the trustor or any other person having a
subordinate lien or encumbrance of record chooses to cure the default, he must
do so by paying the arrearage within one month of the filing of a notice of default.
Originally, the Act provided a four month cure period; however, lenders criticized
it, arguing it delayed the trustee's sale for an unnecessarily long period of time.
See Kessner, supra note 1, at 386.
The Act specifically provides that a trustor, his successor in interest, or any
other person holding a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record, may cure a
default. Defaults that may be cured include the payment of principal, interest,
taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, or advancements made by the benefici-
ary under the terms of the trust deed. The cure is achieved by the payment of all
amounts in default, including the costs and expenses actually incurred by the
trustee due to the breach, and all trustee's fees (not to exceed fifty dollars or one-
half of one percent of the entire unpaid principal sum secured, whichever is
greater). NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1012 (1981).
111. The validity of acceleration clauses has long been recognized in Nebraska mort-
gage law. See Moorehead v. Hungorford, 110 Neb. 315, 193 N.W. 706 (1923); Hock-
ett v. Burns, 90 Neb. 1, 132 N.W. 718 (1911); Plummer v. Park, 62 Neb. 665, 87
N.W. 534 (1901); Beisel v. Artman, 10 Neb. 181, 4 N.W. 1011 (1880). The cure
provisions of the Trust Deeds Act might appear to invalidate acceleration of the
debt in the event that the trustee exercises a power of sale. Acceleration clauses
should nonetheless be included in trust deeds, so that if the beneficiary elects
judicial foreclosure or an action at law on the note, the debt will be due in full.
112. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1012 (1981). It is possible for a trustor to remain one month
behind on his payments due to the cure provisions of the Act. However, this
practice would be costly, since the trustor would be taxed the fees and expenses
of the default. This extra expense should discourage such a practice.




Notice of sale is given by publication in a newspaper having a general
circulation in the county in which the trust property is located.114 The
notice must be published at least once a week for five consecutive
weeks, with the last publication to be at least ten days, but not more
than thirty days, before the sale. The notice must contain the time
and place of the sale along with a description of the property to be
sold.115
As with the notice of default, the notice of sale must be sent to all
persons who have requested such notice by making a request in the
trust deed or by filing a request for notice of sale with the register of
deeds.116 Notice must be sent by registered or certified mail and must
be mailed at least twenty days before the trustee's sale.117 Addition-
ally, if the federal government has recorded a tax lien on the trust
property more than thirty days prior to the sale, the trustee must give
notice of sale to the District Director of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice.1 18 Such notice must be in writing and must be given at least
twenty-five days before the trustee's sale is held.119 If notice is prop-
erly given, a federal tax lien will be discharged by the trustee's sale.20
However, the Secretary of the Treasury is allowed 120 days from the
date of the sale in which to redeem the trust property.12 '
The Act provides that a power of sale shall not be exercised until
both notice of default and notice of sale have been given in the appro-
priate manner.122 The Act fails to provide a remedy for a trustor or
114. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1007(1) (1981).
115. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1007(1), (2) (1981). For statutory form of notice of sale, see
Appendix.
116. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1008 (Supp. 1984). The Act provides that any person desir-
ing personal notice of the trustee's sale must make a written request for such
notice after the execution of the trust deed and before the filing of any notice of
default. I& In contrast, Nebraska mortgage law requires that before a mortgagor
or junior lienor's redemption rights will be extinguished, such persons must have
been made parties to the foreclosure action. Sedlack v. Duda, 144 Neb. 567, 13
N.W.2d 892 (1944); Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes, 143 Neb. 58, 8
N.W.2d 545 (1943); Clement v. Doaks, 140 Neb. 265, 299 N.W. 505 (1941). As a
consequence, mortgage foreclosure procedures provide junior lienors greater pro-
tection against the inadvertent loss of their security interests, whereas the Act
may operate to cut off their interests without personal notice.
117. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1008 (Supp. 1984). As the Act requires only that notice of
sale be mailed to each person who has recorded a request for notice of default, the
trustee is not obligated to prove receipt of notice. See supra note 106.
118. I.R.C. § 7425(b)(1) (1976). If the trustee fails to comply with the federal notice
provisions, the tax lien will survive the trustee's sale and the subsequent pur-
chaser will take the property subject to the federal tax lien. Id.
119. Treas. Reg. § 301.7425(3)(d)(1) (1983).
120. I.R.C. § 7425(b)(1) (1976).
121. I.R.C. § 7425(d) (1976).
122. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1006(1),(2)(Supp. 1984). The Act prohibits the exercise of
power of sale only until such time as notice has been given. Arguably, the Act
could be interpreted to provide that a sale conducted in violation of the notice
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junior lienor who has been denied the proper form of notice. Clearly,
the aggrieved party may seek an injunction if the defect is discovered
prior to the date of sale.123 However, once the trust property has been
sold and a trustee's deed has been executed to a bona fide purchaser
without notice of the defect, the rights of the respective parties be-
come more complicated. If the deed contains recitals attesting to the
trustee's compliance with the Act's notice requirements, then the deed
operates as conclusive evidence that all notice requirements were
met.124 Consequently, the aggrieved party will not be able to chal-
lenge the purchaser's title based on a defective sale,125 and instead has
to bring an action against the trustee for damages. 126
provisions is void. Such an interpretation is unlikely, however, because the Act
contains provisions allowing a defective sale to be cured so as to vest the pur-
chaser at the trustee's sale with good title. Because the Act's drafters have antici-
pated defective sales and have provided a remedy for a purchaser, it is clear that
such defects will not cause the sale to be void. See infra note 149.
123. Although courts are reluctant to grant injunctions, such a remedy is designed to
prevent future injuries or non compliance with the law. See Walling v. Lippold,
72 F. Supp. 339, 351 (D. Neb. 1947). Because the trustee's sale and the subsequent
execution of a trustee's deed operate to extinguish the trustor's interests in the
trust property, an injunction is the proper remedy if the defect in notice proce-
dure is discovered before sale. See, e.g., Propst v. Board of Educ. Lands & Funds,
156 Neb. 226, 55 N.W.2d 653 (1952), cert denied, 346 U.S. 823 (1953); Leeman v.
Vocelka, 149 Neb. 702, 32 N.W.2d 274 (1948).
124. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1010(1) (1981). If the trustee's deed omits recitals outlining
the trustee's compliance with the Act's notice provisions, or if the purchaser is a
party who had notice of a defective sale, then an aggrieved party may attack the
purchaser's title based on the improper sale. See infra notes 143-50.
125. It is not clear under the Act whether a junior encumbrancer's lien would remain
intact in the event that a bona fide purchaser received a trustee's deed containing
the necessary recitals constituting conclusive evidence of compliance with the
Act. This is because the trustee's deed is deemed to relate back in time to the
date of the execution of the trust deed. See infra note 145. Consequently, the
trustee's deed operates to cut off the interests of a junior lienor. In contrast, Ne-
braska mortgage law recognizes that a party not properly served and made a de-
fendant to foreclosure action is not bound by the foreclosure decree. Hassett v.
Durbin, 132 Neb. 315, 319, 271 N.W. 867, 869 (1937) (foreclosure decree, sale, and
sheriff's deed held to be void as to a defendant who was a resident of Nebraska at
the time of the action, but had been served only by publication); Herbage v. Mc-
Kee, 82 Neb. 354, 355, 117 N.W. 706, 707 (1908) (defendant in foreclosure action
who does not appear and upon whom personal service is not made is not bound by
foreclosure decree).
126. The Oregon Trust Deeds Act provides that the trustee's failure to give notice to a
person entitled to notice of sale invalidates the sale as to that person. As to all
other persons, however, the sale remains valid. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.770(1) (1983).
The Oregon provision equates a notice of sale with a summons in a civil action, so
that parties not served with notice are not bound by the sale. If Nebraska were to
adopt such a provision, it would create a conflict with section 1010(1) of the Trust
Deeds Act. Section 1010(1) operates to cut off interests of junior lienors as well as
trustors upon the execution of the trustee's deed. Furthermore, the Oregon pro-
vision operates so that the trustee's error is borne by an innocent purchaser, as it
is his title that becomes subject to attack by the omitted party. A more equitable
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After meeting all notice requirements, the trustee's sale may be
held. The Act provides that the trustee shall sell the property at pub-
lic auction, conducted by either the trustee or his attorney. 2 7 The
auction must be held between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and
must take place on the trust property or at the courthouse in the
county in which the trust property, or a portion thereof, is located.128
The trustee is responsible for the conduct of the sale, and must fairly
represent the interests of both the beneficiary and the trustor. Mis-
conduct on the part of the trustee may lead to a successful attack on
the validity of the sale.129 Inadequacy of sale price, however, is ordina-
solution would hold the trustee strictly liable for a failure to give notice, and
specifically authorize the aggrieved party to recover damages from him.
127. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1009 (1981). Beyond establishing that the sale must be con-
ducted by the trustee or his attorney, the Act fails to indicate whether a profes-
sional auctioneer may be appointed to conduct the sale. There is authority
supporting the position that the duty to conduct the sale is not delegable. This
position rests on the presumption that the debtor selected the trustee with confi-
dence in the trustee's integrity and discretion. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Qualls, 139
Tex. 340, 346, 162 S.W.2d 671, 675 (1942) (one trustee or duly appointed substitute
can sell the property); Barksdale v. Stickland & Hazard, 220 Ala. 86, 89, 124 So.
234, 237 (1929) (trustee cannot delegate authority to conduct sale and must be
present to supervise it, although he may employ an auctioneer to cry the sale);
Fuller v. O'Neil, 69 Tex. 349, 350, 6 S.W. 181, 181 (1887) (office of trustee cannot be
delegated without express authority). A more reasonable approach would be to
allow the sale duties to be delegated to a professional auctioneer. This position
recognized that the sale is merely a ministerial function of the trustee. Palmer v.
Young, 96 Ga. 246, 22 S.E. 928 (1895).
128. The Act does not specify whether the trustee must sell the trust property in
whole or in parcels. In other jurisdictions, two divergent practices have evolved.
One practice holds that because the trust property was encumbered as one unit, it
must be sold as one unit. Other courts have recognized that the trustee must sell
by parcels if it would result more favorably for the debtor. See generally, G. Os-
BORNE, supra note 15, at § 340.
Nebraska mortgage law provides that the court issuing a decree of sale may
order the sale of the mortgaged property in whole, or alternatively, may order the
sale of only that part which is necessary to discharge the amount due on the debt.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2138 (1979). In the absence of a court order, the general rule
in Nebraska is that distinct tracts of land should be separately appraised and sold.
Laughlin v. Schuyler, 1 Neb. 409 (1871). Exceptions to this rule have been recog-
nized, however, so that the sale of the mortgaged property in gross is permitted if
it is in the best interests of the debtor. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Richter, 58
Neb. 463, 464, 78 N.W. 932, 932 (1899) (the trustee's sale of mortgaged property in
gross will be presumed valid in the absence of evidence indicating that the prop-
erty consisted of separate and distinct tracts or lots.); Kane v. Jonasen, 55 Neb.
757, 758, 76 N.W. 441, 442 (1898) (the district court has the power to provide for
the appraisement and sale of mortgaged property either in parcels or en masse, as
the bests interests of the parties may require.); Craig v. Stevenson, 15 Neb. 362,
363, 18 N.W. 510, 511 (1883) (adjoining city lots were properly sold in gross since
there was no evidence establishing them to be separate and distinct from each
other, and "[t]he fact that the tract of land as sold in one body was composed of
what was formerly distinct parts of separate city lots is of no consequence.")
129. See, e.g., Hood Oil Co. v. Moss, 134 Ga. App. 477, 478-79 214 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1975)
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rily not sufficient grounds to set aside the sale.130
The Act provides that any person, including the beneficiary, may
bid at the sale,131 and that every bid is deemed to be an irrevocable
(when sale was not held on date advertised in notice of sale, sale was set aside as
void); Smith v. Haley, 314 S.W.2d 909, 914-15 (Mo. 1958) (trustee's fraud or deceit
in conduct of sale was held to void sale). But see Biddle v. National Old Line Ins.
Co., 513 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (trustee's conduct at sale did not
chill bidding so as to void sale); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sharp, 359 S.W.2d
902, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (trustee's refusal to allow highest bidder a reason-
able amount of time to obtain cash was held to void sale).
Deficiencies in the sale procedure must be raised in an independent action
initated by the trustor, as the trustee's sale is not conducted under the supervi-
sion of a court. In contrast, a mortgagor may raise a defect in sale at the confir-
mation of the sheriff's sale. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1531 (1979). The trustor's
remedies are limited to an injunction, an action at law for damages, or an action
to quiet title.
130. Under Nebraska mortgage law, inadequacy of sale price generally is not grounds
for objection to a judicial sale. The court, however, may review the sale price and
refuse to confirm the sale if, in its opinion, the mortgaged property has a value
equal to or greater than the amount realized at sale. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1530
(1979). See Nebraska Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Patterson, 212 Neb. 29, 30, 321
N.W.2d 71, 72 (1982) (order confirming foreclosure sale of property valued at
$55,000 to $60,000 and sold for $34,008.44 not reversed on appeal for inadequacy of
price); Hollstein v. Adams, 187 Neb. 781, 783, 194 N.W.2d 216, 218 (1972) (confir-
mation of judicial sale of mortgaged property was not abuse of discretion notwith-
standing claim as to inadequacy of sales price); Forsythe v. Bermel, 138 Neb. 802,
805, 295 N.W. 693, 694 (1941) (confirmation of mortgage foreclosure sale will not
be reversed for inadequacy of price, in the absence of showing of fraud, or shock-
ing discrepancy between value and sales price). But see County of Scotts Bluff v.
Bristol, 159 Neb. 634, 637, 68 N.W.2d 197, 199 (1955) (confirmation of tax sale
should be vacated where sale price was inadequate); Ehlers v. Campbell, 147 Neb.
572, 577, 23 N.W.2d 727, 730 (1946) (where sale price is inadequate, it is duty of
court to deny confirmation of execution sale).
131. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1009 (1981). As the Act provides that "any person, including
the beneficiary" may bid at the trustee's sale, it would appear to authorize the
trustee's purchase of the trust property. It is generally held, however, that a
trustee is prohibited from purchasing at his own foreclosure sale, and the fact
that he acts in good faith will not prevent the sale from being found void. Mills v.
Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 216 N.C. 664, 6 S.E.2d 549 (1940). But see Fuqua v.
Burrell, 474 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Whitlow v. Mountain Trust Bank,
215 Va. 149, 207 S.E.2d 837 (1974).
Because the potential conflict of interest that is created when a trustee is per-
mitted to purchase at his own sale, several states prohibit bidding by the trustee.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-315(3) (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.755(1) (1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.070 (Supp. 1983). But see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-810A (1974) (any person, including the trustee or beneficiary may bid at the
sale).
The issue of a purchasing trustee would most likely arise in a case where the
beneficiary elects to act as trustee. In such a case, the beneficiary-trustee should
be allowed to bid at the sale in order to protect his investment in the trust prop-
erty. There is a lack of authority in Nebraska expressly permitting or prohibiting
the trustee from purchasing. The safest course of action would be for the trustee
to resign and have a successor trustee appointed to conduct the sale.
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offer. 32 At the close of the bidding, the trust property is sold to the
highest bidder, who is required to pay the sale price immediately.133
The Act does not specify whether payment must be made in cash, or
whether an alternative form of payment would be acceptable. 3 4
Although the trustee is generally under no obligation to delay the sale
to allow a bidder time to obtain cash or another form of payment, it
has been held to be an abuse of discretion for a trustee to refuse a
trustor's request for a reasonable delay.' 3 5
The person conducting the sale may, for any reason he deems nec-
essary, postpone the sale.136 Thus, if the bids are inadequate in rela-
tion to the value of the trust property, or if inclement weather would
hinder the sale, then the sale should be postponed.137 If the sale is to
be postponed for less than one day, the person conducting the sale
must give public notice of the delay.138 In the event that the sale is to
132. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1009 (1981). The Act provides that if the highest bidder fails
to pay the amount bid, then the trustee may re-auction the property and sell to
the next highest bidder. The defaulting bidder is then liable for any loss caused
by his failure to pay the amount bid.
133. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1009 (1981).
134. Although the Act does not specifiy the form of payment, this provision will most
likely parallel the practice under Nebraska mortgage law. In Nebraska, a sheriff
is not permitted to sell the mortgaged property for other than cash, unless the
foreclosure decree authorizes otherwise. Hooper v. Castetler, 45 Neb. 67, 63 N.W.
135 (1895). It should be possible, however, for the beneficiary to specify in the
trust deed that an alternative form of payment is acceptable.
135. McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d 210, 214 (Alaska 1978) (trustee required to take rea-
sonable and appropriate steps to avoid sacrifice of trustor's property and interest;
however, in the absence of fraud or unfair dealing, courts seldom set aside the
trustee's sale); Foge v. Schmidt, 101 Cal. App. 2d 681, 683, 226 P.2d 73, 74 (1951)
(denial of 15-minute delay for high bidder to obtain cash was unreasonable and
suspect behavior by trustee); Golden v. Tamiyasu, 79 Nev. 503, 513, 387 P.2d 989,
994 (1963) (sale will not be invalidated merely on the basis of inadequacy of sale
price without additional evidence of fraud, unfairness, concealment, oppression
or other satisfying grounds); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sharp, 359 S.W.2d
902, 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (refusal to delay sale for a few minutes while high-
est bidder obtained cash was unreasonable and arbitrary).
136. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1009 (1981). As the Act does not specify grounds for post-
ponement, wide latitude is given to the discretion of the trustee.
137. The trustee is under no obligation to postpone a sale due to inadequate bidding, as
an inadequate sales price, in the absence of fraud or some other form of irregular-
ity, will not invalidate a sale. See supra note 130. However, the beneficiary may
want to postpone the sale in order to protect his right to a deficiency judgment,
since the Act limits the measure of a deficiency to the amount of indebtedness
less the greater of fair market value or sales price of the trust property. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1013 (1981). See infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
138. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1009 (1981). The notice need not be written, rather the
trustee must only make a public declaration of the fact that the sale is to be post-
poned. Although the Act does not require an announcement of the date and time
of the postponed sale, the better practice would include such details in the an-




be postponed for more than one day, the Act requires that notice of
the delay must be given in the same manner as the original notice of
sale was given.139 Although the Act is not entirely clear on this point,
a reasonable interpretation suggests that the trustee must send writ-
ten notice of the postponement to all parties who have recorded a re-
quest for notice of default.140
The Act does not limit the number of postponements that are per-
missible. Instead, broad discretion is given to the judgment of the per-
son conducting the sale.141 As the trustee's ability to postpone the sale
has led to abuse in other jurisdictions, it may become necessary in Ne-
braska to limit the trustee's ability to postpone the sale.142
Upon receipt of a satisfactory form of payment, the trustee must
execute and deliver to the purchaser a trustee's deed.143 The trustee's
deed operates to convey to the purchaser the trustee's title, along with
any interests that the trustor or his successors may have had in the
trust property.144 Although the Act does not clearly indicate whether
the interests of junior lienors are cut off by the trustee's sale, the
weight of authority supports the position that the trustee's deed extin-
guishes such interests.145 Consequently, the purchaser takes title to
139. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1009 (1981).
140. The Act provides that in the event that the sale is postponed for longer than one
day beyond the date designated in the notice of sale, "notice thereof shall be given
in the same manner as the original notice of sale is required to be given." NEB.
REV. STAT. § 76-1009 (1981). This provision is vague and could be interpreted to
require the trustee give written notice of sale, and publish such notice, before the
postponed sale may be held. Such an interpretation would require at least a 45
day delay, as the Act requires publication for at least five weeks, followed by a
ten day delay before sale. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1007 (1981). Requiring such a
procedure, with its resulting delay, would defeat one of the primary purposes of
the Act-the swift recovery of collateral by lenders. Furthermore, it would dis-
courage postponements of sales for more than one day. Therefore, it may be
more reasonable, in the event of a postponement for more than one day, to re-
quire the trustee to send written notice of the postponement (containing the time
and date of the rescheduled sale) to all persons entitled to receive notice of
default.
141. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1009 (1981). "The person conducting the sale may, for any
cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale ...... Id (emphasis added).
142. See, e.g., Craig v. Buckley, 218 Cal. 78, 79, 21 P.2d 430, 431 (1933) (23 postpone-
ments of sale over a period of five months was held not unreasonable); First Nat'l
Bank v. Coast Consol. Oil Co., 84 Cal. App. 2d 250, 256, 190 P.2d 214, 217 (1948)
(trustee allowed to postpone public sale over a period of more than four years);
Holland v. Pendleton Mortgage Co., 61 Cal. App. 2d 570, 574, 143 P.2d 493, 496-97
(1943) (sale postponed three times in one year and then held without notice of
sale was void).
143. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1010(1) (1981).
144. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1010(2) (1981).
145. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1010(2) (1981). Although the Act fails to clearly establish
whether a power of sale foreclosure extinguishes the liens of all junior encum-
brancers, authority supports such a reading of the statute. As a result, the deed
given to a purchaser at the trustee's sale will relate back in time to the execution
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the trust property free of any rights of redemption, and free and clear
of all liens or encumbrances that arose after the execution of the trust
deed. No confirmation of the trustee's sale is required, and title passes
to the purchaser upon delivery of the trustee's deed.146
As suggested earlier, the trustee's deed should include recitals that
the trustee has complied with the notice provisions of the Act.147
With respect to bona fide purchasers for value and without notice of a
defect in the sales procedure, such recitals constitute conclusive evi-
dence of the trustee's compliance with the Act.14s Thus, a purchaser
without knowledge of an irregularity in the sale procedure is pro-
tected in the event that the trustor challeges the validity of the sale
based on defective notice. As to all other persons, however, such recit-
of the trust deed, so that the purchaser takes the property subject to only those
encumbrances which existed prior to the trust deed relationship. See Lown v.
Nichols Plumbing & Heating, 634 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); Alaska Laborers Train-
ing Fund v. P. & R. Enters., 583 P.2d 825 (Alaska 1978); Cook v. Huntley, 44 Cal.
App. 2d 635, 112 P.2d 889 (1941); Kansas City Mortgage Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
555 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. App. 1977); Brask v. Bank of St. Louis, 533 S.W.2d 223 (Mo.
App. 1975).
However, when the trustee's sale is based on a junior trust deed, the sale cuts
off only those interests created subsequent to the trust deed, so that in the ab-
sence of a subordination agreement, the prior encumbrance remains intact. This
raises a strategic problem for the beneficiary of a junior trust deed in default:
should the property be sold subject to the senior encumbrance, or should the se-
nior lienor be "bought out" so that the trust property may be sold unencum-
bered? If the beneficiary decides to sell the trust property subject to preexisting
encumbrance, then that interest should be disclosed in the notice documents so
that junior encumbrancers and prospective purchasers are fully apprised of the
situation.
146. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1010(2) (1981). In contrast to the Trust Deeds Act, Ne-
braska mortgage law recognizes that a sheriff's deed operates to convey an incho-
ate estate to a purchaser. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1533 (1979). Title to property
purchased at a sheriff's sale does not vest in the purchaser until the sale is con-
firmed by the court issuing the decree of sale. Smith v. Carnahan, 83 Neb. 667,
670, 120 N.W. 212, 213 (1909); Yeazel v. White, 40 Neb. 432, 436, 58 N.W. 1020, 1021
(1894); State Bank v. Green, 10 Neb. 130, 134, 4 N.W. 942, 943 (1880). Even after
the confirmation of the sheriff's sale, the purchaser's interests are subject to re-
demption at any time until a final appeal is taken. Mummert v. Grant, 118 Neb.
651, 652, 225 N.W. 773, 773 (1929); Philadelphia Co. v. Gustus, 55 Neb. 435, 437, 75
N.W. 1107, 1108 (1898).
147. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1010(1) (1981). Although the Act is permissive in nature,
and does not require that the trustee's deed contain recitals as to the validity of
the sale proceedings, it is inconceivable that the recitals would be excluded from
the trustee's deed. Title examiners would require some evidence of compliance
with the Act's notice provisions. Thus, to ensure the future marketability of the
trust property, the recitals should be included in the trustee's deed as a matter of
course. Specific provisions that should be included in the deed include: recitals
as to all mailings; personal delivery and publication of the notice of default; any
mailing of the notice of sale; publication of notice of sale; and provisions relating
to the conduct of the trustee's sale. Id
148. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1010(1) (1981).
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als constitute merely prima facie evidence of the trustee's compliance
with the Act.149 Therefore, if the trustee or any other purchaser with
notice of a defect in the sale purchases the trust property, the Act pro-
vides only a presumption of validity-rebutable by the presentation of
evidence on the issue.150
After the trustee's deed has been executed and delivered to the
purchaser, title, as well as the right to possession of the trust property,
vests in the purchaser. The Act, however, does not indicate how a pur-
chaser should obtain possession of the trust property in the event that
a recalcitrant trustor remains in possession after the trustee's sale. As
self-help is not a viable alternative under Nebraska law,151 the pur-
149. Id. One commentator has categorized defects arising in the exercise of a power of
sale foreclosure in three ways. First, there are those defects so substantial they
render the sale void. Examples include forged trust deeds, or a case in which
power of sale is exercised when the underlying obligation is not in default. Be-
cause the sale is void, no title or interest can pass to a purchaser at the trustee's
sale. Thus, recitals in the trustee's deed that the trustee has complied with notice
provisions of the Act do not operate to perfect title in a bona fide purchaser, as
the recitals relate to the sale procedure, and not to the validity of the sale.
A second type of defect is described as a voidable defect, whereby legal title
passes to a purchaser at the trustee's sale, subject to attack by the party harmed
as a result of an improper exercise of the power of sale. An example of a voidable
defect is the case where a trustee fails to give notice of sale to a junior lienor.
Recitals in the trustee's deed, as proscribed by the Act, operate to perfect title in a
bona fide purchaser for value, as the recitals go to the defect raised. Since the
purchaser's title is immune from attack, the aggrieved party's only remedy is to
seek damages from the trustee.
Finally, some defects are so inconsequential as to the render the sale neither
void nor voidable. In the case where a minor defect in notice arises, the sale will
probably not be subject to attack, and the aggrieved party's only remedy is to seek
damages from the trustee. G. OSBORNE, supra note 3, at §§ 7.20 - 21.
150. If the trustee is allowed to purchase at the trustee's sale, recitals in the trustee's
deed should not operate to provide a presumption of compliance with the notice
provisions of the Act. Because the purchasing trustee supervises the sale, he
would be chargeable with actual knowledge of any defects and the recitals will
not protect his interest from attack. Thus, in the situation where a lender acts
both as trustee and beneficiary under a single trust deed, recitals will not provide
additional protection for the lender's title.
A more difficult question arises when a beneficiary purchases the trust prop-
erty, for it is not clear whether the trustee's knowledge of sale defects will be
imputed to the beneficiary, thus denying him the protection provided by recitals
in the trustee's deed. Arguably, knowledge of the trustee's actions should be im-
puted to the beneficiary so as to discourage rascality on the part of the beneficiary
or trustee in the exercise of the power of sale. However, valid considerations
weigh against imputing such knowledge to the beneficiary. Recitals add stability
to the titles of property foreclosed by power of sale. The argument can be made,
therefore, that the beneficiary should receive the full protection of the recitals so
as to protect the title of the trust property in the hands of a subsequent
purchaser.
151. E.g, Anderson v. Carlson, 86 Neb. 126, 128, 125 N.W. 157, 158 (1910); Tarpenning v.




chaser has two alternative means of obtaining possession. First, the
purchaser may bring an action for ejectment. 52 Since the purchaser
must establish title in order to prevail in an ejectment action,153 the
proceeding would be costly and would cause delays in obtaining pos-
session of the property.154 An alternative remedy is an action in forci-
ble entry and detainer.1 55 However, such an action would not
conclusively establish title in the purchaser. 156 Neither remedy is en-
152. An action for ejectment is an appropriate remedy if there are questions about the
validity of the purchaser's title, since title is tried in an ejectment action. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Robertson, 171 Neb. 324, 330, 106 N.W.2d 192, 196 (1960) (ejectment is
appropriate remedy for recovery of real estate by one claiming legal title from
one in possession claiming an estate therein); Malloy v. Malloy, 35 Neb. 224, 227,
52 N.W. 1097, 1098 (1892) (for plaintiff to recover via ejectment, he must possess
legal estate in the premises and be entitled to immediate possession).
153. It is clear in Nebraska that the plaintiff must plead and prove title in himself in
order to sustain an ejectment action. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2124 (1979). See Ko-
zak v. State Game & Parks Comm'n, 189 Neb. 525, 527, 203 N.W.2d 516, 518 (1973)
(in ejectment action, there is no burden on defendant to prove title; rather plain-
tiff must establish title in himself and cannot rely upon a defect in defendant's
title); Reams v. Sinclair, 97 Neb. 542, 545, 150 N.W. 826, 827 (1915) (plaintiff in
ejectment action must prove that he had legal title at the commencement of the
action and was entitled to possession); Bridenbaugh v. Bryant, 79 Neb. 329, 333-34,
112 N.W. 571, 573 (1907) (plaintiff cannot recover in ejectment action unless he
shows legal title in himself, right to possession, and unlawful detention by the
defendant); Zion Church v. St. John's Church, 75 Neb. 774, 774, 106 N.W. 1010,
1010 (1906) (plaintiff must have both legal title and right to possession to main-
tain ejectment action); Comstock v. Kerwin, 57 Neb. 1, 5, 77 N.W. 387, 388 (1898)
(plaintiff in ejectment action cannot rely on defect in adversary's title, but must
recover, if at all, on the strength of his own title or right to possession).
154. An action for ejectment must be initiated by complaint, service of process, and a
trial. Thus there is substantial delay and expense in obtaining possession. Actu-
ally establishing title in the purchaser should not be difficult, however, if the
trustee's deed (under which he holds title to the property) contains recitals as to
the validity of the sale. See supra notes 147-50 & accompanying text. However,
the purchaser will remain out of possession until such time that he prevails in the
ejectment action, and must bear the costs of the proceeding. This would tend to
decrease the marketability of the trust property.
155. Forcible entry and detainer actions are generally restricted to landlord-tenant
relationships. Nebraska, however, recognizes the right of a purchaser to bring
such an action. NEB. REv. STAT. § 24-569 (1979) ("proceedings ... may be had in
all cases against tenants ... [and] in all cases of sales of real estate or executions,
orders or other judicial process when the judgment debtor was in possession at
the time of the rendition of judgment of decree, by virtue of which such sale was
made .... ). Id See Knapp v. Reed, 88 Neb. 754, 757-58, 130 N.W. 430, 431
(1911) (right to recover possession of realty by forcible entry and detainer is not
necessarily limited to cases involving landlord/tenant relationship); Green v.
Morse, 57 Neb. 391, 395, 77 N.W. 925, 926 (1899) (action in forcible entry and de-
tainer lies in favor of a purchaser at a judicial sale to recover possession of prem-
ises purchased when the judgment or decree was rendered).
156. In an action in forcible entry and detainer, the only issue before the court is the
plaintiff's right to possession. The court is prohibited from trying title; it can only
determine which party has the right to possess the lands in dispute. See e.g.,
Kresha v. Kresha, 211 Neb. 92, 96, 317 N.W.2d 776, 779 (1982); Hogan v. Pelton, 210
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tirely satisfactory, as both involve judicial actions with the resulting
delay and expense being passed on to the purchaser.
5 7
Following the trustee's sale, the trustee must dispose of proceeds
generated by the sale in accordance with the priorities established by
the Act.158 The trustee must first pay all costs and expenses incurred
in exercising the power of sale.159 After the costs of the sale have
been paid, the balance of the funds must be used to satisfy the obliga-
tion secured by the trust deed.160 Next, junior trust deeds, mortgages,
or other liens must be paid, with any surplus to be paid to the persons
legally entitled to it.161 Although the Act does not establish with any
certainty those persons who would be entitled to a portion of any sur-
plus generated by the trustee's sale, such parties would most likely
include tax claimants and general creditors of the trustor, as well as
the trustor himself.1 62 As the trustee cannot be certain of the priority
Neb. 530, 534, 315 N.W.2d 644, 647 (1982); Jones v. Schmidt, 163 Neb. 508, 510, 80
N.W.2d 289, 291 (1957); Gregory v. Pribbeno, 143 Neb. 379, 382, 9 N.W.2d 485, 487
(1943); Miller v. Maust, 128 Neb. 453, 457, 259 N.W. 181, 183 (1935); Van Sant v.
Beuder, 101 Neb. 680, 683, 164 N.W. 711, 712 (1917); Towles v. Hamilton, 94 Neb.
588, 592, 143 N.W. 935, 936 (1913); Stone v. Blanchard, 87 Neb. 1, 5, 126 N.W. 766,
768 (1910); Grohowsky v. Long, 20 Neb. 362, 365, 30 N.W. 257, 258 (1886); Myers v.
Koenig, 5 Neb. 419, 421 (1877).
Although an action in forcible entry and detainer provides the benefit of a
swift recovery of the trust property, it does not conclusively establish title in the
purchaser. Furthermore, such a remedy entails an adversarial process, involving
the costs of any other judicial proceeding.
157. One solution may be to insert a covenant in the trust deed whereby the trustor or
his successors agree to surrender possession of the trust property as of one month
after the date that he receives notice of default. This would allow the trustor to
have a one month cure period, and then force him to vacate the premises. If the
trustor failed to vacate at that time, the trustee could initiate an action in forcible
entry and detainer, so that upon the sale of the trust property, the trustor would
not be in possession.
158. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1011 (Supp. 1984).
159. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1011 (Supp. 1984). The Act provides that the proceeds of the
trustee's sale should be used to pay all trustee's fees actually incurred, not to
exceed the amount provided for in the trust deed. Additional expenses of the sale
would include publication costs, costs of preparing the property for sale, auction-
eer's fees, and any costs incurred for recording all notices. The Act fails to specify
whether a trustee's attorney fees are an allowable expense. Such fees would
most likely be considered an expense of exercising the power of sale.
160. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1011 (Supp. 1984).
161. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1011 (Supp. 1984).
162. The Trust Deeds Act was recently amended to specifically include holders of jun-
ior trust deeds, mortgages, and other liens as persons entitled to a portion of any
surplus generated by the sale of trust property. L.B. 679, 88th Leg., 1st Sess., 1984
Neb. Laws. § 22. The Act thus follows Nebraska mortgage law, which recognizes
that persons entitled to a surplus upon the sale of encumbered property include
the mortgagor and any junior encumbrancers. Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Continental
W. Corp., 203 Neb. 264, 269, 278 N.W.2d 339, 343 (1979) (first mortgage on encum-
bered real estate will be enforced against entire security and any surplus remain-
ing after satisfication of first lien should be apportioned among junior
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of such claims, the best course of action would be to deposit the sur-
plus with the court in an interpleader action, and allow the court to
distribute the funds.163
If the proceeds from the trustee's sale fail to satisfy the balance due
on the obligation secured by the trust deed, the beneficiary has a lim-
ited right to a deficiency judgment. The Act provides that an action
for a deficiency must be brought within three months after the com-
pletion of the trustee's sale.164 Failure to initiate an action within the
statutory period bars a subsequent attempt to recover a deficiency.
The Act limits the beneficiary's recovery in a deficiency action to
the difference between the amount of the indebtedness and the fair
market value of the trust property, established as of the date of the
trustee's sale.165 In no event, however, may the deficiency exceed the
lienholders); Robertson v. Brooks, 65 Neb. 799, 802, 91 N.W. 709, 711 (1902)
(holder of second mortgage entitled to surplus after satisfaction of debt secured
by first mortgage); Milligan v. Gallen, 64 Neb. 561, 562-63, 90 N.W. 541, 541 (1902)
(junior mortgagee, not a party to the foreclosure of the first mortgage, is entitled
to receive any money resulting from the sale after the first mortgage has been
satisfied); Hatch v. Shold, 62 Neb. 764, 766, 87 N.W. 908, 909 (1901) (excess of sum
for which premises sold at foreclosure sale, after deducting costs and expenses,
should be paid to the mortgagor).
163. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-325 (1979). Where the trustee's sale has generated a sur-
plus, the trustee should institute an interpleader action to resolve the distribution
of any surplus. Provident Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Booth, 138 Neb. 424,429,293 N.W.
293, 296 (1940) (interpleader is an equitable remedy whereby a disinterested
stakeholder in possession of a fund or other property claimed by rival defendants
may require them to litigate among themseleves the issue of ownership); Citizens
Nat'l Bank v. McNamara, 120 Neb. 252, 253, 231 N.W. 781, 781 (1930) (where one,
owing a debt claimed by two or more persons, makes the respective claimants of
the debt parties to the proceeding and at the same time deposits the debt with the
court, then the applicant shall be released). The issue of disposing of a surplus
does not arise when a mortgage is foreclosed, since the court that issues the de-
cree of foreclosure has jurisdiction to provide for the disposition of the proceeds
of the sheriff's sale. Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Continental W. Corp., 203 Neb. 264,
269, 278 N.W.2d 339, 339, 342 (1979) (trial court has the power to include in the
decree of foreclosure an order for disposition of the proceeds of sale of the prop-
erty); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Nebraska Land Corp., 192 Neb. 588, 593,
223 N.W.2d 425, 428-29 (1974) (if surplus remains after sale and satisfaction of the
mortgage, district court has full power to determine the interests of all of the
parties in the surplus); Mauzy v. Elliott, 146 Neb. 865, 870-71, 22 N.W.2d 142, 145
(1946) (if surplus remains after the payment of the mortgage debt and costs, the
court may, in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, bring in all parties necessary to
a determination of fund ownership).
164. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1013 (1981).
165. The amount of the indebtedness includes interest, costs, expenses of the trustee's
sale, and the trustee's fee. NEB. REV. STAT. § 761013 (1981). The Act does not
limit the trustee's fee, assessable upon the exercise of a power of sale, as com-
pared to the limitations imposed on the trustee's fee for default. See supra notes
67-71 and accompanying text.
Upon the bringing of a deficiency action, the court is instructed to make a
finding of fact as to the fair market value of the trust property on the date of the
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difference between the sale price and the amount of the debt.166 In
contrst, a Nebraska mortgagee may recover the difference between
the amount realized at the judicial sale and the amount of the unpaid
debt.167 Thus, if a trust deed is foreclosed by judicial proceedings
rather than by a power of sale foreclosure, the beneficiary may be able
to realize a greater deficiency judgment.168
The restrictions the Act places on deficiency judgments after a
power of sale foreclosure are not uncommon. Several jurisdictions
either impose similar restrictions, 169 or prohibit altogether the recov-
ery of a deficiency judgment170 when a power of sale is exercised. Be-
trustee's sale. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1013 (1981). Since the beneficiary will want
to prove that the fair market value of the trust property was equal to or less than
the sales price realized, the issue of valuation will be a major point of contention
in a deficiency action. Therefore, both the beneficiary and the trustor must be
prepared to produce evidence of the value of the trust property.
166. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1013 (1981). The Act provides an upper limit on the amount
recoverable in a deficiency action, which is also the traditionally recognized
amount recoverable in a mortgage foreclosure action. An example may help to
clarify the operation of the Act: Assume that the trust property had a fair mar-
ket value of $100,000 as of the date of the sale; that the debt outstanding was
$120,000; and that the trustee's sale yielded $90,000. The Act would operate to
limit the deficiency judgment to the difference between the fair market value and
the debt outstanding, or $20,000, with such judgment not to exceed the difference
between the amount of the debt owed and the sum realized at the trustee's sale,
or $30,000. Because the beneficiary recovers the smaller of two measures, judg-
ment would be entered in the amount of $20,000.
167. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Claussen, 138 Neb. 518, 293 N.W. 424 (1940); Fed-
eral Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Cramb, 137 Neb. 553, 290 N.W. 440 (1940). In order
for a mortgagee to initiate a deficiency action in Nebraska, he must first exhaust
the relief afforded by the foreclosure action. See supra notes 99-102.
168. The Act provides that a trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided by
law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1005
(Supp. 1984). The Nebraska foreclosure provisions would control in the event
that a beneficiary elects to foreclose a trust deed rather than exercise a power of
sale. One incident of the foreclosure process is the right to a deficiency judgment.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2139, to - 2140 (1979). Because a foreclosure sale is judi-
cially supervised, the policy considerations that support the limitation of a defi-
ciency under a power of sale foreclosure are not present when judicial foreclosure
is elected. See infra note 172. As such, the amount of deficiency recoverable may
be one factor to consider when the beneficiary elects between judicial foreclosure
and the exercise of power of sale.
169. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-814(A) (1974); IDAHO CODE § 45-1512 (1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-32 (1953).
170. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (1974); CAL. CIV. PROC. § 580(d) (West 1982);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 86-770 (1983); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 61.24.100 (Supp. 1983). The policy that supports the denial of a
deficiency judgment after a power of sale foreclosure places a creditor's choice of
remedies on somewhat equal ground. In California, for example, if a judicial sale
is elected, the trustor has a statutory right of redemption which should act to
keep bids nearer to the market value of the property. In contrast, a California
trustor has no statutory right of redemption after a power of sale foreclosure, so
there is no incentive for the beneficiary to bid up to fair market value of the trust
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cause a trustee's sale, unlike a sheriff's sale, is not subject to judicial
supervision, such limitations are deemed necessary in order to protect
the trustor from the beneficiary's attempts to manipulate the sale and
subsequent deficiency judgment.171 Consequently, the Act forces the
beneficiary to secure the highest possible price for the trust property
at the trustee's sale. Moreover, it will induce the beneficiary to bid at
the sale, so as to prevent a third-party bidder from realizing a bargain
purchase at the beneficiary's expense. 172
V. CONCLUSION
Although several questions are left unanswered by the Trust
Deeds Act, trust deeds should prove to be a viable alternative to the
traditional real estate mortgage. The Act is fair to both the borrower
and lender, and operates to balance the interests of each. The Act pro-
vides a lender with a quick and inexpensive means of recovering his
collateral by authorizing the use of power of sale foreclosure. At the
same time, the Act preserves the rights of borrowers, as it requires the
full disclosure that the instrument is a trust deed and not a mortgage,
grants the borrower the right to cure a default and avoid the sale of his
property, and limits the borrower's potential liability in the event of a
deficiency action. Because the Act has provided lenders with a mecha-
nism to avoid judicial foreclosure while protesting the interests of the
borrower, the trust deed may ultimately replace the mortgage as the
primary means of securing real property loans in Nebraska.
Richard P. Garden, Jr., '84
property. It was feared that the beneficiary would bid below market, and then
sue the trustor for a deficiency judgment. The solution in California was to deny
the beneficiary any incentive to bid below market value, by eliminating the recov-
ery of a deficiency judgment. J. HETLAND, CALIFORIA REAL ESTATE SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 248-50 (1970).
171. Kessner, supra note 1, at 393.
172. In the absence of a limitation on the amount of deficiency judgment recoverable
after a power of sale foreclosure, the beneficiary might be tempted to bid well
below the fair market value of the trust property and then later obtain a defi-
ciency judgment. The result would unjustly enrich the beneficiary at the trus-
tor's expense, for the beneficiary could dispose bf the trust property at a profit
and also enforce the deficiency judgment. Such a scheme is more tempting in
light of the fact that a trustor has no equity of redemption under the Act. Thus,
the limitations imposed by the Act serve to protect the trustor from a dishonest
beneficiary. Moreover, the limitations may serve to compensate the trustor for





(insert name and address of new trustee) is hereby appointed suc-
cessor trustee under the trust deed executed by
as trustor, in which is named beneficiary and
as trustee, and filed for record _
19_, and recorded in book , page _, Records of
County, Nebraska.
Signature
Notice of Trustee's Sale
The following described property will be sold at public auction to
the highest bidder at the _ door of the county




Request for Notice of Default
Request is hereby made that a copy of any notice of default and a
copy of notice of sale under the trust deed filed for record
, 19_, and recorded in book , page _ , Records of
County, Nebraska, executed by
as trustor, in which is
named as beneficiary and as trustee, be mailed
to (insert name) at (insert address)
Signature
Cancellation of Notice of Default
The undersigned herby cancels the notice of default filed for rec-
ord _ , 19_, and recorded in book , page , Records of
County, Nebraska, which notice of default re-
fers to the trust deed executed by as trustor, in
which is named as beneficiary and
as trustee, and filed for record
19_, and recorded in book , page _, Records of
County, Nebraska.
Signature of trustee
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